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A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING OF
SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION:
SOLELY A MATTER OF CHOICE?
April L. Cherry*
I.

lNTRODUCI'ION

Demographers of international population trends have found
that adults prefer male offspring. 1 This desire for male children is
currently being realized by the use of both pre-conception and post
conception sex-selective reproductive techniques and technologies.
While there are many ways for a woman to attempt to select the
sex of her child before conception,2 there are essentially two proce
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Cline, Donna Christie, Tanya Hernandez, and Denise Morgan for their helpful sug
gestions; Timothy Schardl and Amy Ray for their excellent research, critical analysis
and editing skills; Gail Crawford and Marla Butler for their help in finalizing the
draft; and Elzy Williams for her superb typing of the manuscript. Moreover, I would
like to thank Florida State University College of Law for its summer research grant
which made this work financially possible. And last but certainly not least, I would
like to thank Andre Taylor, Laura, Pamela, Joyce and Aaron Cherry who cared for my
babies so their mama could get her work done. Of course any errors in this work are
mine alone.
I. NANCY E. WilLIAMSON, SoNs OR DAUGHTERS: A CRoss-CuLTURAL SURVEY OF PA
RENTAL PREFERENCES (1976); Sanford Winston, Birth Control and: the Sex-Ratio at Birth,
38 AM. J. OF Soc. 225 (1933). Preference for male children is not quite universal. For
example, among some societies in New Guinea, female children are more highly val
ued than male children. MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE
SOCIETIES 171 (1963).
2. The medical advice is varied on pre-conception sex-selective techniques. For
those who are uncomfortable with sex-selective abortion, but still want a male child,
bookstores are filled with "how-to books" designed to help couples procure a male
161
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<lures now used which can positively identify the sex of the fetus after
conception: chorionic villi sampling (CVS),3 and the most popular
technique - amniocentesis. 4 After identifying the sex of the fetus,
the fetus may be aborted for the purpose of sex-selection.
child. The techniques usually suggested include advice on the timing of intercourse
with respect to ovulation, douching, shallow versus deep penetration of the penis, as
well as advice regarding whether or not the woman should have an orgasm. See, e.g.,
LANDRUM B. SHETILES & DAVID M. RoVIK, How TO CHOOSE THE SEX OF YoUR BABY
(1989); TRACEY HoTCHNER, PREGNANCY AND CHll.DBIRTH: THE COMPLETE GUIDE FOR A
NEW LIFE 35-37 (1984); M. Ruth Nentwig, Technical Aspects of Sex Preselection, in THE
CusroM MADE CHn.o?: WOMEN-CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 181, 183-84 (Helen B.
Holmes et al. eds., 1981); Nancy E. Williamson, Buys or Girls? Parent's Preferences and
Sex Contro~ 33 POPULATION Buu. l, 18-21 (Jan. 1978) [hereinafter Buys or Girls?]. An
other popular pre-conception sex selection technique employed by fertility clinics is
the separation of androgenic and gynogenic sperm. Nentwig, supra, at 183-84. One
such separation method is differential centrifugation. This process separates the an
drogenic and gynogenic sperm, which can then be artificially inseminated in a wo
man. In some clinics the gynogenic sperm are destroyed after the separating process.
Thus, in these clinics, only couples wanting to insure the birth of a male child can be
serviced. Id. at 181, 182-83. Another sperm separation technique differentiates an
drogenic from gynogenic sperm by their mobility. The faster swimming androgenic
sperm are separated from the slower moving gynogenic sperm. Id. at 183. This pro
cedure is said to have an approximately 80 percent success rate for women wanting
male children. See, e.g., Stephen L. Corson et al., Sex Selection by Sperm Separation and
Insemination, 42 FERTILITY & STERILTIY 756, 759 (1984). For a description of other
methods of sex selection, see Betty B. Hoskins & Helen B. Holmes, Technowgy and
Prenatal Femicide, in TEST TUBE WOMEN 237, 238-39 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1989).
3. Chorionic villi sampling is a procedure conducted during the first trimester of
a woman's pregnancy. A suction tube is inserted through the cervix (or less often
through the abdominal wall} which aspirates sloughed fetal cells. The DNA of the
cells is examined for indication of the fetus' sex. See Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2,
at 241-42. This test may be performed in the ninth to eleventh weeks of the preg
nancy. Aliza Kolker & B. Merideth Burke, Deciding About the Unknown: Perceptions of
Risk ofWomen Who Have Prenatal Diagnosis, 20 WOMEN & HEALTH 37, 38 (1993); see also
Aliza Kolker et al., Attitudes About Abortion of Women Who Undergo Prenatal Diagnosis, 9
REs. IN Soc. OF HEALTH CARE 49, 52 (1991). Thus, if an abortion is performed, it can
be performed in the first trimester when the physical risks, and perhaps the emo
tional trauma, is lower or reduced. The procedure carries a risk of miscarriage "from
less than 1 percent in some centers to 10 percent or higher in others, depending on
the physicians'experience with the procedure." Kolker & Burke, supra, at 38; see also
Nentwig, supra note 2, at 185. Also, first trimester abortions are more readily available
and less expensive than second trimester abortions. Thus, CVS done for sex identifi
cation purposes permits abortions done for the purpose of sex-selection to be less
emotionally traumatic for the women and provides greater access to women who wish
to abort their fetuses for the purpose of sex-selection.
4. Frances E. Kobrin & Robert G. Porter, Jr., Sex Selection through Amniocentesis and
Selective Abortion, in SEX SELECTION OF CHll.DREN 47, 47-48 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983).
Amniocentesis is usually used to determine whether the fetus has chromosomal ab
normalities, metabolic abnormalities, or neural tube defects. It is also used when
medically indicated to determine the sex of the fetus in order to diagnose the possibil
ity of certain sex-linked diseases. Id.
Amniocentesis can be performed any time between the fourteenth and twentieth
week of pregnancy. It usually takes about four weeks for the physician to receive the
results from the laboratory. In amniocentesis, a needle is inserted into the amniotic
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Currently two states have prohibited the use of abortion for the
purpose of sex-selection: Pennsylvania and Illinois.5 Under Penn
sylvania's statute, no abortion is to be performed except by a physician
after either: "I) She determines that, in her best clinical judgment,
the abortion is necessary; or 2) She receives what she reasonably be
lieves to be a written statement signed by another physician ... certify
ing ... that the abortion is necessary. "6 Further, the statute provides
that "[i]n determining ... whether an abortion is necessary, a physi
cian's best clinical judgment may be exercised in light of all factors
(physical, emotional, psychological, familial and the woman's age) rel
evant to the well-being of the woman. No abortion which is sought
solely because of the sex of the unborn child shall be deemed a neces
sary abortion." 7
Illinois' abortion law also prohibits sex-selective abortion. The
statute does not include a requirement that the physician find the
abortion to be "necessary," as in Pennsylvania; rather, it prohibits
aborting viable fetuses, 8 and abortions which are performed "with
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on
account of the sex of the fetus." 9 In addition, subsection (8) provides
that this prohibition shall not be construed to proscribe the perform-

cavity which surrounds the developing fetus. Amniotic fluid is removed and analyzed
by the karyotypic technique, which provides the physician "with genetic information
regarding the fems. Amniotic fluid cells cultivated in this manner have been shown
to successfully predict the sex of the fems/infant in 99.93 percent of the cases studied.
M.S. Golbus et al., Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis in 3000 Amniocenteses, 300 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 157, 162-64 (1979), cited in Kobrin & Potter, supra, at 47. The risk of miscarriage
as a result of the procedure is between .005 and .01 percent, see Kolker et al., supra
note 3, at 51, and the trauma of losing a pregnancy in the second trimester is well
documented: "[b]y that stage in the pregnancy the fetus has a social as well as a
physical and emotional reality.••• Neither the fetus' life, its death, nor the parents'
participation in that death can be denied," id.; see also Susan Hodge, Waitingfor Amni
ocentesis, 320 NEW ENG.J. MED. 63, 63-64 (1989). Fetal sex can also be determined by
the use of ultrasonic scanning during the third trimester. Because third trimester
abortions are often prohibited by state statute, this method is not used for the pur
pose of sex-selection. See generally MARY ANNE WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICA
TIONS OF SEX SELECTION 7 (1985).
5. Cf. The Abortion Act 1967 (Great Britain) as amended, does not permit the
termination ofpregnancy solely on the grounds offetal sex. As a result of the passage
by Parliament of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 (HFE Act), the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority has sought to determine whether pre
conception or pre-implantation techniques for sex-selection are "necessary or desira
ble" for social or medical reasons in order to determine whether to grant licenses to
centers providing these services. HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY,
SEX SELECTION: PUBuc CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 5 (Great Britain 1993).
6. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3204(a) (1983).
7. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (1994).
8. Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 510/5 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
9. Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 510/8 {Smith-Hurd 1993).

164

WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 10:161

ance of an abortion on account of the sex of the fetus because of a
genetic disorder linked to that sex. 10
While there are millions of abortions performed each year in the
United States,1 1 relatively few appear to be performed for sex-selective
purposes. Although the number of sex-selective abortions is almost
impossible to determine because women are not required to disclose
why they are choosing abortion, one 1988 survey of obstetrician/gyne
cologists suggests that approximately 100 abortions for sex-selection
are performed each year in the United States. 12
Although seemingly small numbers of abortions are performed
for the purpose of sex-selection, sex-selective abortion nevertheless
presents important questions in the development of feminist thinking
about abortion rights. Sex-selective abortion challenges feminist
thinking with regard to the development of new methods or strategies
for extending women's freedom and autonomy. Sex-selective abor
tion highlights weaknesses in choice rhetoric. Furthermore, the prob
lem of sex-selective abortion demonstrates the importance of
continuing feminist critique of whether the doctrines of choice and
privacy, in the area of reproductive rights, empower women or allow
men or the state to secure their own misogynist, familial, or popula
tion control agendas.
Often the issue of abortion is framed as a feminist issue of choice
and respect for women's bodily integrity. Under this rubric, a woman
chooses whether or not to have an abortion, at least until the point of
fetal viability. Her decision may be based on her private circum
stances, so she need not give any reason for requesting an abortion.
10. Id. For a further discussion of legislative proposals regarding sex-selective
abortion, see Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technol.ogy Enabling The Predetenni
nation ofa Ghil.d's Gender, 6 HAR.v.J. L. & TECH. 1 (1992); George Schedler, Benign Sex
Discrimination Revisited: Constitutional and Mural Issues in Banning Sex-Selection Aburtion,
15 PEPP. L. REv. 295, 296-97 (1988); John Schaibley, Sex Selection Aburtion: A Constitu
tional Analyru of the Aburtion Liherty and A Person's Ri.ght to Know, 56 IND. L. J. 281

(1981).
11. In 1988 there were approximately 1.59 million legal abortions performed.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 83 (1993).
12. USA Today on TV (WINH television broadcast, Feb. 7, 1989). It is interesting
that although ten percent of geneticists and physicians in a survey stated that they
were willing to perform an abortion based on sex-selection, the number of acknowl
edged abortions for sex-selection purposes is quite low. Id. One physician, Dr. Haig
H. Kazazian, at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, which performs sex selection abortions
with mandatory counseling, suggests that American women are not willing to take the
risks necessary in a second trimester abortion in order to choose the sex of their
child:
[T]he clinic has not experienced an increase in requests for sex selection,
and it has not yet terminated a pregnancy for sex selection alone. Our over
all experience during the past eight years leads us to believe that couples
desiring sex selection who are willing to undergo midtrimester abortion are
uncommon in American society.
Haig H. Kazazian,Jr., A Medical View, 10 HAsr!NGs CENTER REP. 17, 18 (Feb. 1980).
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Many feminists have supported sex-selective abortion in these terms,
viewing any restriction regarding pre-viability access to abortion as
working against the goal of equality for women. For example,
although feminist ethicist Tabitha Powledge understands that in the
context of sex-selection of children, "to prefer males is, unavoidably,
to denigrate females," 13 she nevertheless takes the position vis-a-vis
sex-selection that
[i]mprovements in the position of women depend on women being
able to obtain abortions without needing to justify their deci.Sions to
anyone but themselves. Restrictions retard that goal. . . . [T] o pre
serve what improvements in their lot women have achieved, society
should seek no legal restrictions on reproductive freedom, even on
a technology that will be used selectively against females. I recog
nize its irony, but view this position as part of the price of furthering
the goal of equal treatment. 14

Thus, the substantive outcome is subordinated to process neutral
ity. In this instance process neutrality is embodied in the abstract
moral and legal concepts of "choice" and "privacy," which are derived
from a male-dominated tradition of classical liberalism. Classical lib
eralism assumes that all citizens have a zone of liberty in which to
make intimate decisions. While liberalism protects individuals from
unwarranted government intrusion into decisions regarding the pri
vate sphere, it does not require nor encourage individuals to behave
in ways that further the interests of the community. Nor does it pro
mote women's interests in equality. 15 Thus, by focusing on the pro
cess of whether bodily integrity and liberty are protected, feminists
like Powledge fail to pay close attention to the substantive outcome 
the abortion of female fetuses.
The dilemma, of course, is that feminism has traditionally
s_tressed the importance of women's control over their bodies and re
productive control in achieving social, political, and economic equal
ity.16 Sex-selective abortion, like other "new" reproductive
technologies, challenges this traditional liberal feminist position. The
effects of an individual woman's use of the technology goes beyond
herself. The technology affects women as a social class. In the case of
sex-selective abortion, "the paradox posed by individual choices even
tually alter[s] every woman's experience of maternity and mother
13. Tabitha Powledge, Toward A Maral Policy for Sex Choice, in SEx SELECTION OF
CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 201, 206.
14. Id. at 207.
15. As Janice Raymond has noted, "[c]hoice resonates as a quintessential U.S.
value, set in a context of a social history that has gradually allowed all sorts of oppres
sive so-called options, such as prostitution [and] pornography, .•. to be defended in
the name of women's right to choose." JANICE RAYMOND, WOMEN As WoMBs ix-x

(1993).
16. ROSALIND POLI.ACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE,
SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 289-302 (1985).
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hood." 17 Feminists must be circumspect and cautiously evaluate the
social, political, and economic forces that constrain women's "free
choice" and the technical means heralded as liberating their choice.
Liberal individualism, then, may be unhelpful when dealing with the
issue of sex-selective abortion, because ultimately, the use of sex-selec
tive abortion will determine whether women will exist. 18
I imagine that some conservatives may fear sex-selective tech
niques, in the power and control of women, because these techniques
can be used to threaten male power and the existence of men. Thus,
conservatives may fear the use of such powerful tools for the actual
benefit of women. Such apprehension is in opposition to reality. Wo
men do not have control of the technology, and because women lack
real social, political or economic power, sex-selective technologies, in
cluding abortion, are being used to annihilate women before they are
born. Women are therefore being required to participate in their
own pre-victimization 19 through the use of sex-selective techniques
which ensure the birth of male children.
This essay consists of five sections. The first section describes the
problem of sex-selective abortion, including an analysis of sociological
data regarding adult preference for male children and its current ef
fects. In Section Two, I discuss various philosophical paradigms and
analyses of sex-selective abortion with the goal of developing a coher
ent philosophical base from which to argue for a policy regarding sex
selective abortion which furthers the goals of gender equality. Be
cause of the importance of the context of women's lives in the
modified pragmatist analysis, I believe that a modified pragmatic phil
osophical approach is best suited to the task. 2 0 Section Three ad
dresses the constitutionality of sex-selective abortion prohibitions in
light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 21 In Section Four, I outline the lib
eral feminist response to sex-selective abortion and address the inade
quacy of traditional legal doctrines to deal with the issue. Finally, in
Section Five, I propose a feminist treatment of sex-selective abortion.
My construction of a radical feminist analysis moves away from a view
of the procedure as one of individual choice, and acknowledges sex
selection as an issue affecting women as a class. I place the decision
whether to abort on the basis of gender clearly within the feminist
dilemma of double-bind choices.
17. Laura R Woliver, The Deflective Power ofReproductive Technologies: The Impact on
WOMEN AND PoL. 17, 19-20 (1989).
18. See Helen B. Holmes and Betty B. Hoskins, Prenatal and Preconception Sex
Choice Technologies: A Path to Femicide? in MAN-MADE WOMEN, supra note 25, at 1, 25.
19. Janice Raymond, Introduction, in THE CusroM-MAoE CHILD?, supra note 2, at
177, 177.
20. See discussion infra at pp. 181-87.
21. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
Women, 9
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My purpose is not necessarily to suggest a model of law reform.
As Powledge and others have noted, law reform or other types of gov

ernment intervention may, under the current political climate and
conditions of oppression, further jeopardize the abortion right. 22 In
stead, my principal goal is to present a prologue for the consideration
of the role of law in organizing these relationships. I wish to develop a
feminist analysis23of sex-selective abortion which acknowledges the
failures of both traditional privacy an_d equal protection doctrine to
expose the victimization of women in the reproductive context, which
recognizes the needs of women with regard to the sexual composi
tions of their families, and which questions why women are required
to pay the price for "balanced" families by jeopardizing their emo
tional and physical health. Above all, it is my intention to focus on the
issue of reproductive justice.24 As social psychologist Robyn Rowland
22. See Powledge, supra note 13, at 206; see also Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2,
at 245.
23. Political theorist and feminist scholar bell hooks has described feminism as
"a commitment to eradicating the ideology of domination that permeates Western
culture on various levels - sex, race, and class, to name a few - and a commitment
to reorganizing U.S. society so that self-development of people can take precedence."
BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BIACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 194-95 (1981). In her
work, Mary Anne Warren describes what it means to write from a feminist perspective:
This book is written from a feminist perspective. To say this is not to admit a
bias, but to declare a belief in certain facts that I hold to be objectively de
monstrable, and certain values I regard as morally essential. The basic em
pirical belief that unites all feminists is that women of many societies have
been and still are severely oppressed because of their sex. The basic moral
belief is that this oppression is wrong and must be ended.
WARREN, supra note 4, at 2-3. I wish to develop a critique which takes the experiences
of women seriously and focuses more on the impact of this technology and the policy
surrounding the technology on women (as engendered as a socially ,constructed
group) and less on the issue of individual choice as it is understood by many liberals,
including liberal feminists.
24. Although I am concentrating exclusively on the issue of abortion, there are
other reproductive rights that are vital to women if we are to achieve equality and
reproductive justice, and accordingly, self-determination. These issues include the
right to have children, i.e., the right not to be sterilized without informed consent.
See, e.g., Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV75-2057 (G.D. Cal. June 30, 1978), aff'd, 639
F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1981); Adele Clark, Subtle Forms of Sterilization Abuse: A Reproductive
Rights Analysis, in TEST TUBE WOMEN, supra note 2, at 188; ANGEIA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN,
RACE, AND CIASs (1983); Susan E. Davis, Contraception, Abortion, and Sterilization Today:
What Choices do Women Really Have?, in WOMEN UNDER ATTACK! VICTORIES BACKIASH
AND THE FIGHT FOR REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 15-30 (Susan E. Davis ed., 1988); Carlos
Velez, Se Me Acab6 La Candon: An Ethnography ofNon-Consenting Sterilizations Among
Mexican American Women in Los Angeles, in MExlCAN WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 71
(Magdelena Mora & Adelaida R Del Castillo eds., 1980).
These issues also include the right to be free from forced medical treatment
while pregnant. See e.g., In re A.G., 573 A.2d 1235 (1990) (en bane) (recognizing
mother's right to bodily integrity as against state's right to protect fetus); In re Ja
maica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985); Raleigh Fitkin v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537
(NJ. 1964); George Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut ofAll, 12 liAsTINGS
CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16-17, 45 (1982); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and
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noted: "We need to challenge our own thinking and the current tech
nology without eroding the hard-won gains we have made in repro
ductive choice. In the end, does the new technology mean a transfer
of power to women as a social group?"25
I.

SOCIOLOGICAL DATA: DEMOGRAPHICS AND PREDICTIONS

Daughters and dead fish are no keeping wares.
- 18th Century English proverb
A gfrl lets you down twice, once at birth and the second time
when she marries.
- A common Korean saying

Demographers have reported that there are 100 million women
missing from the world's population. 26 According to United Nations'
estimates, there were only 987 females for every 1,000 males in 1990.
The crisis is much more severe among female children than among
adult women. Fewer and fewer female children are being born. 27
Although the popular media in the United States would have us be
lieve that these "missing girls" are solely a "third world" or non-West
ern problem, 28 the shortage of girl children is as severe in Western
"developed" nations as it is in the "developing" world. Although in
1990, the "developing" world had approximately 954 girls (nineteen
years old and younger) for every 1000 boys, the "developed" world
had only 952 girls for every 1000 boys. While much of the social com
mentary on these "missing" women has focused on "son fixation" 29 of
South Asian, particularly Indian, culture, the demographics indicate
that Western nations, including the United States, are also involved in
producing this precarious and "unnatural" condition of world-wide
sex ratios.

Interoentions: Whats Wrong with Fetal Rights, IO HAR.v. WoMEN's LJ. 9 (1987). See gener
ally Gayle Binion, Reproductive Freedom and the Constitution: The Limits on Choice, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 12 (1988).
25. Robyn Rowland, Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of
'Choice' in Sex Presekction, in MAN-MADE WOMEN 74, 86 (Gena Corea et al. eds., 1987).
26. Amartya Sen, More than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REv. BooKS 61
(Dec. 20, 1990); Nicholas D. Kristof, Stark Data On Women: 100 Million Are Missing,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at Cl; Irene Sege, The Grim Mystery of the Worlds Missing
Women, BosroN GLOBE, Feb. 3, 1992, at 25.
27. The normal ratio of women to men is 1:1. The Worlds Women, 1970-1990,
Statistical Office ofU.N.'s Secretariat, U.N., Series K, No. 6, at 13 (1991). The biologi
cal normal sex ratio at birth is 105 or 106 boys for every 100 girls born. Susan Green
halgh & Jiali Li, Engendering Reproductive Policy and Practice in Peasant China: For a
Feminist Demography of Reproduction, 20 SIGNS 601, 601 (1995).
28. See, e.g., Jo McGowan, In India, They Abort Females, NEWSWEEK, January 30,
1989 at 17; Steven R. Weisman, No More Guarantees ofa Sons Birth, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
1988, at Al. (Both Articles discuss amniocentesis for the purpose of sex-selection as a
problem in India, with no mention of the phenomenon in the Western World.)
29. Nera Kuckreja Sohoni, Where Are the Girls?, Ms., July-Aug. 1994, at 96.
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The focus of social commentators on sex-selection in non-West
ern cultures is due in part to the West's understanding of religious,
cultural and economic factors in those cultures which make the birth
of sons crucial. For example, post-conception sex-selective techniques
are used quite frequently among the well-educated in countries such
as South Korea and China, where there is a strong commitment to the
Confucian dictate that only men can perform the required rites of
ancestorworship. 30 There is also evidence that in the People's Repub
lic of China the policy of encouraging couples to have only one child
has led to greatly decreasing numbers of female children being born
and ofwomen in society as a whole. 31 In India, the prevalence ofpost
conception sex-selective techniques is understood in the context of
the cultural tradition of dowry, which causes daughters to be enor
mous economic hardships, and in which an unmarried daughter is a
negative "social stigma."32 Also, many Indian girls face female infanti
cide and the discriminatory allocation of food and health care. 33
30. Neil G. Bennett, Sex Selection of Children: An Overview, in SEX SELECTION OF
CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 8, 9; Alison Dundes Renteln, Sex Selection and Reproductive
Freedom, 15 WOMEN'S Sruo. INT'L F. 405, 410-11 (1992).
31. Greenhalgh & Ll, supra note 27, at 601. In fact, between 1982 and 1989 the
number of boys born per 100 girls rose from 107 to 114, well above the biological
normal level of 105 to 106. Id. For third or higher-order children the ratio of boys to
girls exceeds 125. Id. As Greenhalgh and Ll note, these "numbers tell a frightening
story: little girls are being eliminated from Chinese society ... the largest society on
earth - on a massive scale." Id.
32. Dowry is defined as the property that a woman brings to her husband when
she marries. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 443 (5th ed. 1979). Although the dowry has
been outlawed in India by the Central Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, it is still quite
prevalent. See Weisman, supra note 26, at Al. In fact, it seems as if the size of the
dowries that are demanded by the bridegroom and his family are growing rapidly. Id.
at A9. One reporter noted that "dowries as high as $10,000 are common among fami
lies who earn that kind of money in a year's work." Id. As a response to the continued
prevalence of dowry, the Indian Parliament amended the dowry Prohibition Act in
1984, to introduce more stringent penalties for the giving and taking of dowry. Indira
Jaising, Violence Against Women: The Indian Perspective, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERsPECTIVES 51, 54 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper
eds., 1995). Nevertheless, daughters continue to be a severe economic hardship and
because unmarried daughters are viewed with scorn, there continues to exist great
cultural and economic incentives for families to severely limit the number of female
children they have. Id.
33. Viola Roggencamp, Abortion of a Special Kind: Male Sex Selection in India, in
TEST TUBE WOMEN, supra note 2, at 267; Williamson, Boys or Girls?, supra note 2, at 9
10; see also Austin Hughes, Female Infanticide: Sex Ratio Manipulation in Humans, 2
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 109, 110-11 (1981) (recognizing existence of differential
female infanticide through neglect of female infants). Under these circumstances,
sex-selective abortion becomes an attractive, viable, and rational solution for those
who can afford it! (On rationality see Elster, infra note 59). See Madhu Kishwar, The
Continuing Defidt of Women in India and the Impact of Amniocentesis, in MAN-MADE WO
MEN, supra note 25, at 32. Mothers under these circumstances can also be understood
as fulfilling their maternal duties of care. Just as African-American slave mothers were
understood as protecting their children from the cruelty of slavery through infanti
cide, women under these conditions can be understood as protecting their potential

170

WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 10:161

Some girls and women are killed by their husbands in so-called "dowry
deaths." 34 These conditions have led to the use of abortion for the
purpose of sex-selection in India. s5
female children from a life of neglect and violence through sex-selective abortion.
Regarding the protection of children from slavery through infanticide, see A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education and Missouri Jurisprudence: Shelley v. Kraemer in a
Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 673, 694-95 (1989) (citingJane (a slave) v. The
State, 3 Mo. 45 (1831) ); see also J. CALlFORNIA COOPER, FAMILY 34-38 (1991); TONI
MORRISON, BELOVED 149, 158, 165 (1987).
34. Roggencamp, supra note 33, at 270. "Dowry death" occurs in many cases
where the husband or his family believes that the dowry should have been higher or
where the full dowry has not been paid. Commentators often note that the reasons
given for the murders of these women are pretextual. The term "dowry death" has
only recently been included in the Indian Penal Code. "It is defined as the death of a
woman caused by burns or other-than-normal circumstances within seven years of
marriage, and in which the death has been preceded by dowry-related harassment."
Nikki Lastreto & William Winans, The High Price ofMarriage in India: Burning Brides,
THIS WoRLD, July 2, 1989, at 10. In 1986 the Indian Penal Code was amended to
address the offense of dowry death. Section 304B of the Penal Code states that when
a woman's death is caused by burns or bodily injury "or occurs under other than
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage, and when it is shown that
shortly before her death she was subjected to cruelty in connection with any demand
for dowry ... and the husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death."
Jaising, supra note 32, at 54. One researcher has reported that in 1987 there were
1,418 dowry deaths in India according to police records. Vibhuti Patel, Sex-Determina
tion and Sex-Prese!£Ction Tests in India: Modern Techniques for Femicide, BULL. OF CON
CERNED AsIAN SCHOLARS, Feb. 1989, at 6. Another commentator asserts that more
than 5,000 dowry deaths occur each year in India. Jaising, supra note 32, at 54.
35. There is a general consensus among doctors, commentators and others that
the practice of sex-selective abortions is fairly common in India, though official or
reliable numbers are hard to find. One smvey found that of 8,000 abortions per
formed in Bombay, 7,999 were female fetuses. R. Jeffrey et al., Female Infanticide and
Amniocentesis 19 (11) Soc. Sci. & MED. 1207-12 (1984); see also Lastreto & Winans,
supra note 34, at 11; Jo McGowan, In India, They Abort Females, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30,
1989, at 12. A joint committee of the Indian Parliament found that between 1986 and
1987, as many as 50,000 female fetuses were aborted in India after sex identifying tests
were performed. Ajoy Bose, Abortion: Who Believes in A Woman'.s Right to Choose?
GUARDIAN FEATURES, Aug. 11, 1992, at 15.
One Indian province, Maharastra, (the state in which the city of Bombay lies),
has made abortion for the purpose of sex-selection illegal. It has done so by the
regulation of amniocentesis. See Weisman supra note 26, at Al. This law provides that
amniocentesis is only permitted when medically indicated to determine possible birth
defects. It provides prison sentences and fines for doctors who perform amni
ocentesis for sex-selective purposes and for the female patients and their families who
procure these services. Maharastra Legislature Secretariat, L.C. Bill No. VIII of 1988;
see also Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal Knuwledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and
Sex Se!£Ction, 19(3) HAsrINGS CENTER REP., 21, 25 (1989); Weisman, supra note 28, at
Al. According to some obseIVers, however, there are sufficient "loopholes" to allow
the use of amniocentesis for the selective abortion of female fetuses. Many Indian
gynecologists have expressed the view that the selective abortion of female fetuses is a
permissible and legitimate family planning tool. Vimal Balasubrahmanyan, Women As
Targets in India's Family Planning Policy, in TEST TUBE WOMEN, supra note 2, at 153, 160
61.
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The sociological data indicates that Americans also have a strong
preference for male children. Researchers of American parental sex
preferences for children have consistently found that, although most
Americans strive for "balanced" families (equal number of male and
female children), Americans prefer male children as first-born chil
dren and as only children.36 In families with an odd number of chil
dren, Americans prefer to have more boys than girls. 37 Studies show
that women's attitudes toward the sex of their children are strikingly
similar to those of men. Both women and men in the United States
prefer to have male children rather than female children.38 Sons are
still expected to carry on the family name as well as provide economic
support to their parents when they are older.39 Sons are also pre
ferred in Western culture because sons are still seen as proof of the
father's masculinity.40 Lastly, sons are preferred because potential
parents believe that boys will have vastly greater opportunities than
girls. 41 In one study of the sex preference for first-born children, re
searchers found that 60 percent of those studied preferred a boy as a
first-born child, while only 5 percent preferred a girl as the first-born
child. There vvas little variation in the preferences of men and wo
men. 42 An earlier study of married women showed that one-half of
the women studied had a general preference for sons, while only one
third preferred daughters. 4 3
In a 1989 study, undergraduate college students without children
were asked to state a preferred sex for their first child, as well as their
·willingness to use sex-selective technology (not abortion) .44 Research
ers found that 58 percent of men and 39 percent of women in the
36. See, e.g., Nancy E. Williamson, Parental Sex Preferences and Sex Sdection, in SEx
SELECI'ION OF CHILDREN, 129, 131 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983) [hereinafter Parental Sex
Preferences]; Gerald E. Markle, Sex Ratio at Birth: Values, Variance and Some Determinants,
11DEMOGRAPHY131, 133-37 (Feb. 1974).
37. See, e.g., Markle, supra note 36, at 132.
38. Pebley & Westoff, supra note 36, at 177-89; see also Nora Frenkiel, ''Family
Planning": Baby Boy OT Girl?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at Cl.
39. Renteln, supra note 30, at 408; WARREN, supra note 4, at 14.
40. Renteln, supra note 30, at 408.
41. See id.; Michael Shapiro, A boy OT a girl? Should you be permitted to choose?, Los
ANGELES DAILY J., Aug. 2, 1989, at 7.
42. Markle, supra note 36, at 133-37; cf. Williamson, Parental Sex Preferences, supra
note 36, at 131.
·
43. Williamson, Boys OT Girls?, supra note 2, at 8. The only exception to this pref
erence seems to be regarding adoption. Williamson, Parental Sex Preferences, supra
note 36, at 131. Americans prefer girls for adoption. Researchers note that " 'appar
ently adoptive parents are somewhat reluctant to risk the family name on an adopted
male child.' " Renteln, supra note 30, at 411.
44. Roberta Steinbacher & Faith Gilroy, Sex Selection Technology: A Prediction ofIts
Use and Effect, 124(3) J. OF PSYCHOL. 283, 285 (1990) {The question posed to the
volunteers: "Imagine a time when you are married, or if you are currently married,
when you could inexpensively purchase a device or a pill that would allow you to
select a boy or girl for your first child. Would you buy it and use it? If you ·answered
'Yes', what sex would you select?").
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study preferred boys as first children. Only 8 percent of the men and
24 percent of women preferred girls as first-born children. Hence,
the study showed a significant overall preference of college students
for first-born boys, and that men preferred first-born boys significantly
more than women. 45 These researchers also found that there were no
significant differences in sex preferences of first-born children due to
class, age or race. 46 Only 18 percent of the students smveyed ex
pressed a willingness to use sex-selective technologies in order to real
ize their preferences; among those who did, 73 percent preferred
first-born sons. 47
The cultural similarities and contrasts between South Asian and
United States practices indicated that although son preference or son
fixation is not culturally uniform and the intensity of the phenome
non varies from culture to culture, it is nevertheless a feature of many
developed and developing nations. 48 Son preference and fixation are
widespread because patriarchy is widespread49 and son preference
and fixation are products of patriarchy. As Mary Anne Warren notes,
45. Id. at 285. Steinbacher and Gilroy also found that while white men preferred
sons significantly more than white women, black women are equally likely to prefer
male children as black men, and that black women are more willing to use sex-selec
tive technology than white women. Id. at 286-87.
46. Id. at 287. But see contra, Roberta Steinbacher & Faith Gilroy, Preferencefor Sex
ofChiUAnumg Primiparous Women, 119(6) J. OF PSYCHOL. 541, 544 (1985). Their study
found that in a study of primiparous women (women who are pregnant for the first
time) 59 percent of the women expressed no preference for the gender of their first
child while approximately 23 percent preferred girls and 18 percent preferred boys.
One possible explanation for this deviation from previous research is that "it is not
considered appropriate today for an expectant mother to verbalize a choice of sex for
her offspring.... Perhaps pregnant women are motivated by cognitive dissonance to
express satisfaction with infants of either sex because, in their cases, such determina
tion has already been made." Id.
47. Steinbacher & Gilroy, supra note 40, at 286. In a study of women who had
either amniocentesis or CVS, these researchers found that 19.2 percent of the women
surveyed believed that a woman should have the right to obtain a legal abortion for
the purposes of sex-selection. But only 5.3 percent of the women surveyed would
consider an abortion for herself in order to choose the sex of her child. Aliza Kolker
et al., supra note 3, at 59-60.
48. See, e.g., Williamson, Boys or Girl.s?, supra, note 2, at 6-12; Williamson, Parental
Sex Preferences and Sex Selection supra note 36, at 131-34.
49. With regards to patriarchy, Heidi Hartmann has explained that:
Radical feminists use patriarchy to refer to a social system characterized by
male domination over women. . . . [It is] a set of social relations between
men, which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish
or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to
dominate women . . . Patriarchy is not simply hierarchical organization, but hier
archy in which particular people fill particular places.
Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage ofMarxism and Feminism: Towards a More Pro
gressive Union, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION l, 14, 18 (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981); see al.so
GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 239 (1986).
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patriarchy is maintained inter alia through patriliny and patrilocality;50
through the denial ofwomen's rights to sexual and reproductive inde
pendence, ownership and inheritance of property, education, free
dom of movement, economic employment and political participation;
and through violence or threat of violence against women and girls.51
The sociological predictions regarding the effects of sex-selective
abortion on society highlight the dangers to which abortion for the
purpose of sex-selection subjects American women.52 The first of
these predictions is that the use of sex-selective abortion (and other
sex-selection techniques) will result in a gender imbalance. Demogra
phers have predicted that because of the overwhelming preference
among American women and men for boys as first children, for boys
as only children, and for more boys than girls in families with an odd
number of children, the use of sex-selective procedures will further
reduce the number of women in our sodety.53 Second, it has been
predicted that this reduction will lead to greater discrimination
against women and girls.54 Women in societies with such unbalanced
sex ratios suffer from substantial constraints on their behavior, such as
50. WARREN, supra note 4, at 13. Two components of patriarchy are patriliny and
patrilocality. Patriliny is the inheritance of family names and property through the
male line. Patrilocality is the practice where husbands determine where the married
couple lives, usually with the husband's family group. Id. at 30 n.32. Female infanti
cide is higher in preindustrial cultures practicing patrilocality. See, e.g., Hughes, supra
note 33, at 109. Patrilocal societies are much more numerous than societies practic
ing any other type of residential pattern. Id. at 110. Most patriarchal cultures are
both patrilineal and patrilocal.
51. WARREN, supra note 4, at 13.
52. There are, of course, some predictions in favor of the use of sex-selective
techniques. These predictions include that sex-selection would reduce the number of
sex-linked diseases such as hemophilia and muscular dystrophy, see Jane Friedman,
Legal Implications ofAmniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92 (1974); see also WARREN, supra
note 4, at 160-63, reduce population growth, as women will have fewer children be
cause they can be certain of getting precisely the child with the sex that they or their
families want, see, e.g., Nathan Keyfitz, Forward, in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN, supra
note 4, at xi, xiii, and be psychologically beneficial to all children, in that all children
would know that they were wanted children and would reap the benefits of self-confi
dence from that knowledge, see WARREN, supra note 4, at 173-75; Edward Pohlman,
Some Effects of Being Able to Control Sex of Offspring, 14(4) EUGENICS QUARTERLY 278
(Dec. 1967) (discussing the psychological effects on both parents and children when
child is the "wrong" sex). On the issue of population control, see infra notes 58-60; on
the issue of sex-linked disease see materials regarding abortion and disability, see infra
note 112.
53. CHRISTINE OvERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS
34 (1987).
54. It has been predicted that an increase in first-born boys will lead to further
discrimination against women in numerous areas, but particularly in education and
employment. It is predicted that as a result of the "over-achiever" status of first-born
children, where there are more men than women and where the men have the advan
tage of first-born status, women will be able to acquire even less education and train
ing than we currently receive, and as a result will be less able to compete for
comparable employment. Schedler, supra note 10, at 299-301.
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significant penalties for non-virginity before state recognized mar
riage, proscriptions against adultery, extensive control by men over
their wives and daughters, and the marriage of girls and women at
younger ages.55 Women in these societies are also endangered by fe
male infanticide and neglect,56 and by strong sex role ideologies,
which socially and legally require women to behave according to mod
els of submission and subordination.57
The acceptance of sex-selection by a society will also result in the
targeting of women and our fertility as a method of gender demo
graphic politics. For example, Clare Boothe Luce argued that the in
vention and use of a "male-child birth pill" would c9ntr_ol
overpopulation in two ways: (1) women would have fewer children
because they could predictively get the socially required number of
male children, and (2) if women had more male children than female
children, then there would be fewer wombs and hence fewer babies.
Luce argues that sex-selection is not merely one possible solution to
the problem of population growth, but rather the only practical solu
tion to the dilemma of population control. 58 For example, Luce
writes:
The determining factor in the growth of all animal populations ...
is the [birth] of female offspring. Only women have babies. And
only girl babies grow up to be women . . . . In the overpopulated
countries, the preference for males amounts to an obsession . . . . A
pill ... which ... would assure the birth of a son would come as
man-ah from Heaven.59

What arguments such as Luce's neglect is that the choice of male chil
dren over female children is a result of gender bias and that gender
bias and gender discrimination are sometimes intractable obstacles
for women. 60
Finally, the acceptance and use of sex-selective techniques will
cause what sociologist NormaJuliet Wikler has called distributive con
cerns. 61 Distributive concerns relate to the uneven, racist, heterosex
55. See Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, at 247 (discussing feminist values and
the case against sex preselection; arguing that sex-selection would yield more males
and consequently exacerbate international male misbehavior); MARCIA GUITENTAG &
PAUL SECORD, Too MANY WOMEN? THE SEX RATIO QUESTION 79 (1983) (discussing
traditional role of women withinJewish community, a population with high sex ratio).
56. Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, at 247.
57. GUITENTAG AND SECORD, supra note 55, at 79.
58. Clare Boothe Luce, Only Women Have Babies, NATIONAL REvraw, July 7, 1978,
at 826-27; see also PAUL EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1971).
59. Luce, supra note 53, at 826.
60. This was an important issue at the United Nations Conference on Population
Control in Cairo in 1994. See, e.g., Reena Shah Stamets, Women's Bodies; Women's
Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at ID (discussing how women and their
reproductive abilities throughout the world are pawns of government policy).
61. NormaJuliet Wikler, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The
Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1043, 1047-48 (1986); see generally Rowland,
supra note 25, at 74-87.
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ist and classist barriers to access the technology required to select the
sex of children. In the United States, amniocentesis, chorionic villi
sampling, and abortion are costly, and, as a result, will be available
only to women of the middle and upper classes. Poor women, then,
because of their financial inability to access these procedures, will con
tinue to have female children. The result will be that women in our
society will be poorer and darker. And as political scientist Laura
Woliver suggests, "[c]lass inequalities in the future might even more
closely follow gender [and race] as the rich have privileged first-born
soris, and the poor have both sexes."62 In sum, the social effects of
sex-selective abortion on women will be deleterious: patriarchal socie
ties will use the technology in ways which will further the values of
patriarchy male preference and control over women and
resources. 63
II.

THE MORALI1Y OF SEX SELECTION: SOME

PHILOSOPHICAL

pARADIGMS

[T]he impingi,ng reality of sex presekction [has] maved our discussion of
manipulative medical technologi,es into the realm ofprevictimization, i.e., the
spectre of women being destroyed and sacrificed before being born.
-Janice Raymond (1981)
Arguments concerning the morality of abortion for the purpose
of sex-selection, or abortion more generally, typically take one of
three analytic forms: deontological, consequentialist, or pragmatic. 64
62. Woliver, supra note 17, at 25; see also Roberta Steinbacher, Futuristic Implica
tions ofSex Prese/ection, in THE CusroM MADE CHILD? WOMEN CENTERED PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 2, at 187, 188.
63. For example, artificial insemination results in a preponderance of male off
spring. Approximately 160 boys are born via artificial insemination for every 100 girls.
This disparity is caused by the timing of the procedure. Most physicians insist on
performing the procedure as closely as possible to the time of ovulation. Because Y
chromosome sperm have greater mobility, there is a greater chance that they will
reach the ova before X chromosome sperm. Hence children born via artificial ihsem
ination are most often male. See SHE.TILES & RoVIK, supra note 2, at 68.
64. Rational-choice theory offers another method for assessing the cultural ac
ceptance or disapproval of abortion for the purpose of sex-selection. Rational-choice
theory is a normative explanatory theory which "tells us what we ought to do in order
to achieve our aims as well as possible. It does not tell us what our aims ought to
be.... Unlike moral theory, rational-choice theory offers conditional imperatives,
pertaining to means rather than to ends." Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL
CHOICE 1, 1 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (footnotes omitted). That is, rational choice is
properly defined as "a choice among alternative ends, on the basis of a given set of
preferences and a given set of opportunities (i.e., a given set of available alterna
tives)." John Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in RATIONAL
CHOICE, supra, at 85-86. Under this construction, the appropriateness of behavior or
choices can only be determined if the choice is made without unjustified or unreason
able constraints.
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A Deontol,ogi,cal Perspective
Deontological ethics holds that certain acts are morally right or
wrong regardless of their consequences for human happiness or sad
ness. 65 A deontological philosophical understanding of abortion
maintains that abortion may be right or wrong because the act of kill
ing is right or wrong in and of itself. Morally good acts commonly
entail fulfilling one's responsibilities toward others and respecting the
rights of others. Under this rights-based theory, moral rights are first
determined and then defended without the knowledge of whether
these rights will increase the public welfare. 66 "Once the scope of
these protected interests is defined, any interference with these inter
ests is said to be a violation of the rights of the person or group. "67
Most deontological thinkers would agree that abortion under any cir
cumstance is morally unacceptable because they believe a fetus is a
human life, 68 and it is always wrong to take an innocent life or potenA.

Many contemporary thinkers in law, philosophy, and social theory have argued
that prescriptive moral discourse should be characterized by a view toward expanding
the scope of morally relevant options and effects. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, SOCIAL
THEORY: !Ts SITUATION AND !Ts TASK (1987) (criticizing Marxian determinism and
"positivist" social science for failing to explain how social routines are preserved and
subverted); LAWRENCE E. HAzELRIGG, Cl.AIMS OF KNOWLEDGE: ON THE LABOR OF MAK
ING FOUND WORLDS (arguing in accord with Unger that necessetarian explanations in
the social sciences enjoy unmerited normative force); Noam Chomsky, Equality, in
THE CHOMSKY READER 182-202 (James Peck ed., 1987) (arguing that the conditions we
create, not those that occur "naturally," inform the ethical responsibilities of social
reformers). These authors share the characteristic of emphasizing the ethical impor
tance of recognizing that the context in which social reforms and normative discourse
take place is man-made and contingent, and therefore subject to being understood
and radically revised by ordinary people.
65. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (1967); Schedler, supra note 10, at
305 n.40. Deontological theories are associated with the natural rights tradition. Nat
ural rights theory is one of individual entitlement. It disavows any suggestion that the
consequences of any legal rule could justify the adoption or rejection of that rule. See
Richard Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations ofNatural Law, 12 HARv.J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y
713, 713 (1989).
66. See WARREN, supra note 4, at 27; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 28
(1971) ("in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the rights se
cured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social
interests").
67. Randy E. Barnett, Forward: Of Chickens and Eggs - The Compatibility ofMoral
Rights and Consequential Analysis, 12 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 611, 613 (1989).
68. As Jeff McMahan notes, when opponents of abortion defend their position
by claiming that the fetus is a human they mean "that the fetus shares those attributes,
whatever they may be, the possession of which by normal adult human beings
grounds the special presumption against killing them, making killing them considera
bly more difficult to justify than, for example, the killing of animals." Jeff McMahan,
The Right to Choose and Abortion, 22 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 331, 331 (1993); cf. VATICAN,
CONGREGATION ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Instruction on Respectfor Human Life in
its Origi.ns and Dignity ofProcreation: Replies to Certain Qµestions ofthe Day, in 16 ORIGINS
(Mar. 19, 1987) [hereinafter VATICAN], reprinted in part in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUC
TIVE TECHNOLOGY 83-97 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992) (human life begins at
conception).
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tial life. 69
In contrast, some deontological philosophers argue that sex-se
lective abortion is morally wrong because sexism70 is morally wrong.
For these deontologists, a woman may take a fetal life for almost any
reason she chooses so long as she does not choose a sexist reason. 71
Underlying this reasoning is the belief that it is wrong to take a
human life ·without just cause. Under either of these rationales, the
conclusion that sex-selective abortion is morally unacceptable is
reached by considering the fetus as a human life. Thus abortion is
wrong because it is the unjustified killing of an innocent human
being.
A deontological argument in opposition to prohibitions on sex
selective abortion would insist that the moral value to be protected is
to be found in the individual's right to moral autonomy. Under such
a construction, sex-selective abortion may be morally justified in that
the decision to bear a child under any conditions or circumstances or
for whatever reason is an essential part of moral autonomy. Interfer
ing with that autonomy would be morally wrong as a violation of deon
tological principles. 72
In many ways, the deontological analysis offers an "easy way out."
There is no way to defend the deontological position outside of its
own dogma. For example, the deontological position in favor of
prohibiting sex-selective abortion does not explain why the fetus is
morally relevant, nor does it help us to identify why the fetus has more
69. See, e.g., J. Finnis, The Rights and Wrong.r of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Jarvis
Thomson, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 129-52, (R M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (previously
published 2 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 117-45 (1977) (fetus as innocent) (a reply to Judith
Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 47-66 (1971)). See alsoR M.
Hare, A Kantian Approach to Abortion, in RIGHT CONDUCT 147 (Michael D. Bayles &
Kenneth Henley eds., 1989); cf. Paul Ramsey, Genetic Therafrj, in THE NEW GENETICS
FUTURE OF MAN 157, 175 (M. Hamilton ed., 1972).
70. As feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye notes:
The term "sexist" characterizes cultural and economic structures which cre
ate and enforce the elaborate and rigid patterns of sex-marking and sex
announcing which divide the species, along lines of sex, into dominators
and subordinates. Individual acts and practices are sexist which reinforce
and support those structures, either as culture or as shapes taken on by the
enculturated animals. Resistance to sexism is that which undermines those
structures by social and political action and by projects or reconstruction
and revision of ourselves.

AND THE

Marilyn Frye, Sexism, in THE POLITICS OF REALrrY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 17, 38
(1983).
71. See, e.g., Tabitha Powledge, Unnatural Selection: On Choosing Children's Sex, in
ETHICAL lssUEs IN MODERN MEDICINE 428, 430 (1983); Powledge, supra note 13, at 207;
see also Schedler, supra note 10, at 305 n.42.
72. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Schneider, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEM
PLE L. REv. 1003, 1036 (1993) (pro-choice view satisfies Kantian ethical approach}; cf.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 47 (1971).

178

WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 10:161

moral relevancy than unfertilized ova or sperm. 73 It presumes obvi
ously questionable moral or ethical values to be universal and provides
women with a moral defense, albeit questionable, of their choice to
abort for sex-selective purposes. 74 In addition, the deontological posi
tion that sex-selective abortion is wrong because it is the unjustified
taking of a human life is troubling because it negates the pregnant
woman's moral agency and her biological role in reproduction. The
fetus is alive because the pregnant woman has made it viable. To ig
nore her contribution to the fetus' existence by giving the fetus equal
moral standing with the pregnant woman denies the pregnant wo
man, and women generally, full moral status. 75 To view the moral
status of the fetus as equal also devalues the social contributions pro
vided by women who give birth and raise children. 76

Consequentialism
Consequentialism is also known as utilitarianism. There are two
major categories of utilitarian thought: rule utilitarianism and act util
itarianism. Rule utilitarians believe that an act is morally wrong if the
act violates a prescribed moral rule. Rule utilitarians regard a clear
normative system as essential to an ordered society. In other words,
rule utilitarians believe that the best approach is to follow moral rules
and evaluate the consequences of following those rules in the category
of circumstances in dispute. "The theory is utilitarian in that it esti
mates the value of actions by reference to their consequences, but the
actions are not divorced from the obligation to follow moral rules. "77
Act utilitarians, on the other hand, make moral judgments based on
the consequences to others of specific acts or patterns of action. That
is to say, act utilitarianism is "an ethical method based on an assess
ment of consequences for individual situations. "78 As such, act utilita
rianism eschews adequate confrontation of large socio-ethical issues
like sex selection. 79
B.

73. WARREN, supra note 4, at 94; see also Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103
HAR.v. L. REv. 105, 127 (1989).
74. The moral status of the human fetus has been the subject of some contro
versy, particularly since 1973. For differing views, see e.g., Michael]. Flowers, Neu.r<>
maturation of the Human Fetus, 10 J. MEo. & PHIL. 237, 246-48 (1985); VATICAN, supra
note 68.
75. See GENA CoREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION To ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 61 (1985) (noting that women must

bear the discomfort and socially adverse consequences of sex selection); Mary Anne
Warren, The Moral Significance of Birth, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS
198, 209 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura Purdy eds., 1992); see also ADRIENNE RICH,
OF WOMAN BoRN 266-67 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
76. Cf. Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise - Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REv. 921, 936 (1992) [hereinafter Abortion Compromise].
77. John C. Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy: Should Sex Choice be Discouraged, in
SEx SELECTION OF CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 213, 222-23.
78. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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When referring to consequentialist philosophy in the context of
sex-selective abortion, I am referring to the moral theories of rule util
itarianism which "hold that we should consider first the consequences
that follow from applying the moral practices of the community to the
decisions at hand."80 And if "it can be shown that consistently follow
ing this moral policy leads to reprehensible amounts of pain . . . or
long-term social upheaval, we are obligated to reassess the ordering of
moral rules."81 Contemporary consequentialist philosophy is con
cerned not only with principles of right and wrong, but also With his
torical circumstances and institutional arrangements. It "takes
seriously the wide-reaching and highly dispersed effects that the ac
tions of individuals and associations may often have on others. "82
Hence consequentialist analysis is often understood as protecting the
public sphere from the harmful acts of individuals. Under this ethical
tradition, abortion generally is morally defensible if the net beneficial
consequences to society of permitting abortion are greater than the
net benefits of prohibiting abortion. It is generally understood,
although by no means uncontested, that the social benefits to women
(and hence to society) of permitting abortion are greater than the
benefits of prohibiting it.
One consequentialist position is that sex-selective abortion in a
society with institutional biases directed against women would result
in harms to women over time. As previously noted, the sociological
data indicates that a smaller population ofwomen, particularly if their
smaller numbers were due to sex-selection, would be disastrous for
women.83 As George Schedler recognizes, the social costs of sex-selec
tive abortion may not be borne solely by the woman seeking the abor
tion. Rather, the costs are borne by future generations of women in
the form of increased discrimination against them: "It is beyond ques
tion, however, that women would pay the cost for the preponderance
of males in terms of their disappointment, trauma, and lowered ex
pectations."84 This analysis is in line with the tradition of liberal utili
tarian thinking: "the only purpose for which power can rightfully be
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others. "85
Although this consequentialist analysis seems to present a coher
ent argument against the use of abortion or pre-conceptive tech
niques for the purpose of sex-selection, such a position fails to address
80. Id. at 224.
81. Id.; see all-o]ohn Rawls, Two Concepts of Ru'les, 64 PHIL. REv. 3 (1955).
82. Barnett, supra note 67, at 618; see all-o Epstein, supra note 65, at 715.
83. See supra pp. 173-75 regarding the effects of further gender imbalance.
84. Schedler, supra note 10, at 310.
85. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., 1978); see JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984) {discussing what types of power the state may
rightly exercise over individuals in the form of criminal sanctions to prevent harms to
others); Schedler, supra note 10, at 308-11, 310 n.53.
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the problem of indeterminacy: 86 the outcome of sex-selective abor
tion may be difficult to predict given the variables involved. This con
sequentialist position also fails to consider the problem of uncertainty:
the fact that we cannot know with complete accuracy whether these
negative social consequences will ever occur. 87 Our societal interest
in liberty does not allow us to restrict the liberty of citizens without
good cause - it is unclear whether predictions regarding deleterious
consequences would constitute harm sufficient to warrant limitations
on liberty. Finally, this consequential analysis fails to recognize that
the individual decision to use abortion for the purpose of sex-selec
tion can be viewed as a morally correct decision under other types of
consequentialist thinking. Oppressive circumstances in a woman's life
or environment may make the choice of sex-selective abortion morally
defensible, even under a consequentialist analysis. The morally rele
vant circumstances for these women are the amount of discrimina
tion, and hardship, and perhaps the violent death their daughters will
face if they are born. Warren makes a similar point with respect to the
rationality of individual sex-selection choices. 88
A consequentialist analysis can also be used to discourage the
prohibition of sex-selective abortion. This analysis is based on the be
lief that the consequence of prohibiting sex-selective abortion is the
deepening and reinforcing of the misogyny that women already en
counter in patriarchal society by denigrating women as moral deci
sion-makers and reinforcing our role as sexual objects. 89 As women
are increasingly viewed as irresponsible moral and sexual agents,
greater restrictions on women's sexuality and reproductive capacities
are deemed acceptable. 90 Hence, consequentialist analysis can also be
used convincingly to argue that a prohibition on sex-selective abortion

86. Indeterminacy is distinct from uncertainty. Indeterminacy refers to the qual
ity of a problem which makes an outcome difficult or impossible to predict because
the variables involved do not necessitate a specific answer. Uncertainty refers to the
accuracy of a predictive model.
87. See WARREN, supra note 4, at 179; Powledge, supra note 13, at 195.
88. See WARREN, supra note 4, at 79-80; see also infra pp. 208-12 for a discussion of
liberal feminism; Hannah Arendt, What is Freedom?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 155
(1969) (rights have value in "the realm where freedom is a worldly reality, tangible in
words which can be heard and deeds which can be seen"); see generally CATHARINE
MAcK!NNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
89. See Olsen, supra note 73, at 121; see also Law, Abortion Compromise, supra note
76, at 940 (mandating waiting periods sends a powerful message: women make rash
decisions and women are not competent moral or practical decision-makers).
90. Carol Smart, Disruptive Bodies and Unruly Sex: The Regulation of Reproduction
and Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, in REGULATING WOMANHOOD: HISTORICAL ESSAYS
ON MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALnY 7 (1992); The Republican Party's pro
posed Personal Responsibility Act in the CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, quoted in 94 TAX
NoTES TODAY 222 (Nov. 14, 1994) (asserting that "government should encourage peo
ple to work, not to have children out of wedlock").
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would work against the goal of sex equality by reinforcing the socio
political subordination and oppression of women.91

Pragmatism
Pragmatists belong to a philosophic school of thought which is
founded on the belief that philosophy should examine the conse
quences of proposed theories when investigating issues of truth and
the probable effects of solving human needs and problems.92
Pragmatists believe that it is necessary to examine context when evalu
ating any proposed action, that "it is critical to pay attention to partic
ular details of problems and to the effects of the solutions." 93
Feminist philosopher Mary Anne Warren, in her work concern
ing the moral question of the sex-selection of children, adopts a prag
matic moral approach. Instead of determining the moral status of
sex-selection through an analysis of the "formal moral theories," War
ren "adopts the more pragmatic procedure of first exploring the con
text within which sex selection must be viewed." 94 She considers each
of the moral objections to sex-selection in the light of this overall con
text. She views both moral rights and consequential analyses as com
ponents of a coherent moral theory. 95 As a result Warren derives her
moral conclusions from both sociological predictions regarding the
effects of sex-selection on women and the assertion of rights. In her
view, rights should or should not be advanced based exclusively on
their value to the goal of gender equality. 96 Central to Warren's analy
sis of sex-selection is her view that "gendercide" is morally wrong. 97
C.

91. Regarding liberal feminism and its use of consequentialism to argue against
prohibitions, see discussion infra pp. 209-12.
92. Pragmatism is an anti-foundational moral philosophy, for which "the valida
tion ofknowledge'1.aims rests on practical judgments constituted by and constructed
in, dynamic social practices." Knowledge, for the pragmatist, is acquired by "self-criti
cal and self-correcting human processes." Cornel West, The Limits ofNeopragma,tism, in
PRAGMATISM IN LAw AND SoCIE'IY 121, 121-22 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds.,
1991) [hereinafter The Limits ofNeopragma,tism]. Pragmatism is contextual and instru
mental, emphasizing both context and culture of "which we can never be fully aware,"
and shaping and testing thought by its use toward the realization of human goals.
Thomas Grey, 'What is Good Legal Pragmatism? in PRAGMATISM IN LAw AND SOCIETY,
supra, at 9, 15; see also MargaretJane Radin. The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMA
TISM IN LAw IN SOCIETY, supra, at 127, 134.
93. Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597,
lfilO(W9~.

.

.

94. WARREN, supra note 4, at 27-28.
95. Id. at 31 n.60. On the compatibility of deontological theory and consequen
tialism, see also Barnett, supra note 67, at 612, 614; Hare, supra note 69; and RAWLS,
supra note 66.
96. WARREN, supra note 4, at 27; see generally Arendt, supra note 88, at 155 (rights
have value in "the realm where freedom is a worldly reality, tangible in words which
can be heard and deeds which can be seen"); MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note
88.
97. According to Warren, a law or policy is genocidal if "{l) it results in an abso
lute or relative reduction in the number of persons of a particular [sex]; and (2) the
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For Warren, gendercide, like genocide, is a crime against humanity,
because it deprives everyone of the contribution that would be made
by the particular class of persons who are its victims, and because of
the implicit devaluation of all members of the victimized gender.9s
Warren points to the indeterminacy of consequentialist thinking
as a reason for rejecting that view, and argues for "freedom of choice."
Warren asserts that even though she believes that sex-selection is mor
ally wrong, we should not seek to discourage sex-selective abortion by
either legal prohibition or moral persuasion. Instead, she claims that
the right to make reproductive decisions is a deeply personal right to
be defended with care. Accordingly, the moral presumption regard
ing sex-selective abortion should be in support of the freedom to
choose, which cannot be nullified by the mere possibility of harmful
effects to women's equality. 99 She defines the freedom of choice as a
"positive value" which ought to be maintained "in the absence of pow
erful countervailing arguments." 100 In order to override this pre
sumption, the proponents must demonstrate that the prohibition on
sex-selection would produce greater benefits than tolerance. Accord
ing to Warren, "[e]ven an action which is inherently immoral should
not be legally prohibited unless there are good reasons to believe that
prohibition will be beneficial." 101 Because freedom of choice is a posi
tive value, as well as a method for the realization of other positive
values, it requires more than a substantial risk of net social harm to
show that it ought to be prohibited. 102 She describes this philosophi
cal position as having both a meta-ethical component and a pragmatic
component. She attributes her emphasis on freedom of choice to the
metaethical value in giving presumptive "respect for persons as auton
omous agents." Accordingly, mentally competent adults are morally
entitled to as much freedom as is consistent with the equal freedom
and basic moral rights of others. 103 Warren defends her position by
attesting to the danger that a legal prohibition on sex-selective abor
means whereby this result is brought about are morally objectionable for independ
ent reasons - e.g., because they violate certain individuals' right to life, liberty, or
security against wrongful assault." WARREN, supra note 4, at 22-24. Example of
gendercidal, or more specifically gynocidal, institutions and practices include female
infanticide, witch burning, genital mutilation, widow-sacrifice, and the denial of re
productive freedom. See generally id. at 32-55.
98. WARREN, supra note 4, at 24. Warren uses the gender-neutral term
"gendercide" to describe the decline of the number of women due to sex-selection
instead of the gender-specific terms "gynocide" or "femicide," because she believes
that sex-selection can be used against men or biased in favor of female fetuses. War
ren asserts that sex-selection can be used by women as a feminist tool. For example,
Warren suggests that women can use sex-selection technology to refuse to birth and
raise sons as a means of combatting patriarchy. Id. at 175-76.
99. WARREN, supra note 4, at 25-26.
100. Id. at 180.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 182 (emphasis in the original).
103. Id. at 180.

1995] A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION 183

ti.on would have on all other aspects ofwomen's reproductive freedom
in the contemporary and historical context of patriarchal opposition
to women's reproductive freedom. 10 4

D.

Pragmatism ModifiedI0 5

Many radical thinkers have sought to redefine pragmatism and
pragmatic method with the goal of using a modified pragmatism as a
tool in a political theory of liberation for oppressed peoples. These
scholars focus on a social context which has a socio-economic struc
ture of political and economic struggles, as well as racial, gendered,
religious and sexual identi.ti.es. 106 For neo-pragmati.st philosopher
Comel West, pragmatism's focus on context reflects a political theory.
It enables forms of cultural criticism that challenge hierarchical polit
ical and social arrangements that have harmed people of color, wo
men of all races, and poor peoples. 107 Thus "context" in a modified
pragmatic framework refers less to the experiences of uniquely situ
ated individuals, but instead refers to the structures of historical and
contemporary discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orienta
tion or preference and class. As a result, modified pragmatic method
facilitates challenges to political and philosophic theories which, like
traditional pragmatism, speak in the language of liberalism and indi
vidual rights. 108
Mary Anne Warren argues, for example, that the moral presump
tion in favor of the freedom of choice should not be overridden by
the mere possibility of harmful effects, such as the sociological predic
tions of increases in violence and discrimination against women if sex
rati.os suffer further imbalances in favor of men and boys. What War
ren's construction of the context (the sociological data} fails to con
sider is the additional relevance of the sex-identified fetus as a
representative of its gender. Warren's contextual emphasis is upon
the rights of individuals, or the unique experiences of individuals.
Warren's contextual focus is not historical or contemporary discrimi
nation on the basis of race and gender. Although Warren believes
that the morally relevant context is that male-biased sex-selection
would have the consequence of harming future generations of wo
men, Warren does not believe that these consequences to women as a
social group surpass the importance of individual liberty. In other
words, although she acknowledges the moral relevance of male bias in
sex-selection, it is not enough, even as a reality, to overcome her lib
104. Id. at 184.
105. This phrase is taken from Mari Matsuda's article, Pragma,tism Modified and
the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. RE:v. 1763 (1990), concerning the use of a
modified pragmatic philosophy in critical race theory.
106. CORNEL WEST:, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF
PRAGMATISM 208-10, 215 (1989) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY].
107. Id.
108. Minow & Spelman, supra note 93, at 1627.
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eral presumptions concerning the importance of "liberty". The fail
ure of Warren's framework, as well as most other traditional
philosophic paradigms, is that it considers the issue of the morality of
sex-selective abortion in isolation from other relevant questions re
garding social, political, and economic practices that oppress women.
Feminist philosopher Susan Sherwin notes that traditional philoso
phies "are generally grounded in masculinist conceptions of freedom
(e.g., privacy, individual choice, individuals' property rights in their
own bodies) that do not meet the needs [and] interests ... of many
... women." 109
As do most feminists, I view the fetus in abortion as having no
independent moral status, but it may, under some circumstances, be
morally relevant to the discussion of abortion. Because the fetus
grows and lives inside a woman's body, it is the experiences and the
lives of women that set the parameters of the moral inquiry. While
the fetus does not have an independent existence, its life tied to the
woman inside whose body it grows, the fetus' existence has a
profound impact on the lived experience of the woman. Hence, my
view of the moral status of the fetus and the morality of abortion is
grounded in the reality of women's lives which make abortion neces
sary.110 This is the context in which the abortion of an ungendered
fetus must be considered. Sex-selective abortion requires the consid
eration of other relevant aspects of the social world, including the ef
fect of sex-selective abortion on women as a social group.
Therefore, in contrast to Warren, I am arguing that the morally
relevant consequences of sex-selection are not the harm to the partic
ular fetus, but rather the injuries to future generations of women and
the moral relevance of the decision to abort a particular fetus based
on its gender. My contextual focus is shaped by the historical and con
temporary discrimination and other harms done to women as a social
group. As a result, it is morally relevant to me that the fetus is termi
nated because she is a girl and not because she is a fetus - gender
neutral.
When a woman decides to abort a fetus because of its sex, she
forecloses the "easy way out" for moral philosophy wherein the fetus is
or is not a morally relevant being. Sex-selective abortion, because it is
selective, makes the characteristics of the fetus to be aborted morally
relevant. By describing the fetus as morally relevant, I am not sub
scribing to a view of fetal personhood, nor am I equating the moral
status of the fetus with the moral status of the pregnant woman. I can
109. Susan Shenvin, Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens, in LIVING WITH CON·
TRAOICTIONS: CONTROVERSIES IN FEMINIST SOCIAL ETHICS 314, 314 (Alison M. Jaggar
ed., 1994).
llO. See CATHARINE A. MAcKrNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
184-94 (1989). Rosalind Petchesky also notes that this foundational aspect offeminist
think about abortion is often inchoate and unarticulated. See PETCHESKY, supra note
16, at 327.
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think of no situation or circumstance in which I would make such an
equation. Instead I believe that choosing or not choosing a particular
fetus on account ofits sex makes the sex-identified fetus relevant. It is
the use of invidious criteria for selection that imparts morally relevant
attributes to the fetus; it is the desire to "de-select" for those character
istics that gives the fetus greater moral standing or presence. The sex
identified fetus is no longer the generic fetus in the abortion not mo
tivated by fetal gender. By identifying its sex we have particularized it,
and hence decisions regarding aborting it are based on its projected
individual characteristics instead of, or in addition to, concerns about
the woman, her bodily integrity, and her life circumstances. The deci
sion to abort is then a decision based on the fetus' qualities, not the
circumstances of the woman's life.
The sex-identified fetus subject to abortion becomes engendered
because a decision to abort the fetus is made based on cultural no
tions of what it means in the society to be gendered male or female.
Thus, a particular sex-identified fetus becomes representative of its
gender. 111 Under these circumstances the aborting of a female fetus
would be a declaration concerning the social value of women or girls:
that we are, as a group, less valuable and unwanted. A pragmatist
might also argue that sex-selective abortion is wrong because of the
historical and contemporary devaluation of women and girls as a so
cial group. Women's lower status is perpetuated by this type of choice
and because of what it says about the value of women and girls in this
society. We can thus consider sex-blind abortions justified by a wo
man's right to decide her future or because we believe that fetuses
lack morally relevant characteristics, and at the same time consider
sex-selective abortions morally unjustified because the abortion im
pliedly and immediately asserts that the lives of women and girls are
less valuable or less desirable. 112 This position is supported by my un
111. "Sex" is a term describing the biological/physiological differences between
male and female. On the other hand, "gender" "is the cultural definition of behavior
defined as appropriate to the sexes in a given society at a given time. Gender is a set
of cultural roles. It is a costume, a mask, a straightjacket in which men and women
dance their unequal dance." LERNER, supra note 49, at 238. Jane Flax, another femi
nist scholar, shares Lerner's view. Flax writes: "Gender connotes and reflects the
persistence of asymmetric power relations rather than 'natural' (biological/anatomi
cal) 'differences' (e.g., mind/body, reason/emotion, public/private) is identified as
differences and as salient to and constituent of gender." Jane Flax, Beyond Equality:
Gender, justice and Difference, in BEYOND EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE: CITIZENSHIP, FEMI
NIST POLITICS AND FEMALE SUBJECTMTY 193, 193 (Gisela Block & Susan James eds.,
1992); see also CATHARINE A. MAcK!NNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
160 (1989).
112. Similar arguments can be made with respect to the abortion of mentally or
physically disabled fetuses. Women who decide to abort disabled fetuses are making
decisions regarding how they think these children will affect their lives and what they
want their experience of motherhood to be. Women who make these decisions
(along with the rest of society) are also making a statement about the appropriateness
of our goals of physical and mental perfection for our children and ourselves which
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derstanding of social context which includes an examination of
patriarchal structures, historical and contemporary gender
discrimination.11s
Considering the overall historical and contemporary social con
text in which the decision to abort a fetus on the basis of fetal sex
occurs, contemplating the liberal value of "tolerance" in the context
of the goal of gender equality, and weighing the sociological and his
torical evidence that a moral policy of tolerance will lead to continued
and exacerbated long-term social upheaval, we may be obligated to
serves to demean, devalue and isolate members of our society who currently live with
disabilities. Cultural acceptance of abortion under these circumstances also overlooks
the reality that many disabilities can be managed through technology, early interven
tion programs for young disabled children, social programs, and social change.
Deborah Kaplan, Disability Rights Perspectives on Reproductive Technologies and Public Pol
icy, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990's 241, 245 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub
eds., 1989). Thus, in many respects, disabled fetuses can be understood as represen
tative of disabled members of our society, and perhaps we should rethink whether it is
morally permissible to encourage women to abort these fetuses. CJ. Adrienne Asch,·
Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990's, supra, at
69, 86; Adrienne Asch & Michelle Fine, Shared Dreams: A Left Perspective on Disability
Rights and Reproductive Rights, in FROM .ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM: TRANS.
FORMING A MOVEMENT 233, 237-38 (Marlene Gerber Fried ed., 1990); Martha Field,
Killing "the Handicapped" - Before and After Birth, 16 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 79, 115
(1993).
113. The question remains whether the sex-selective abortion of male fetuses
gives me the same level of philosophical and political angst. The answer, of course, is
- well, it depends. While the decision to abort a fetus identified as white and male
may be an expression of an individual woman's devaluation of white men and boys,
such an abortion takes place in a context that is supportive and affirming of men and
boys - patriarchy. Patriarchy as a social, legal and economic structure in this country
has supported white male power. As a result, white men do not suffer from condi
tions of historical or contemporary discrimination or physical and economic violence
as women of all races do. Therefore, the abortion of a white male fetus does not
represent the devaluation men as a social group. Instead, such an abortion can be
viewed as a form of cultural criticism - challenging hierarchial political and social
institutions. See WE<sr, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 106 at 208
10, 215.
The ethical and political implications of aborting a black male fetus because of its
gender are much different from the implications of aborting of a white male fetus.
Although the abortion of a black male fetus arises in the same social context of the
abortion of a white male fetus - a context in which white men enjoy higher status
and value - the consequences of aborting a black male fetus due to its gender are
more complex. Notwithstanding the cultural support and acknowledgement that
black boys and men receive because they are male, the context for the abortion of a
fetus identified as black and male also includes the context of Black boys and men as
victims of patriarchy, because racism (like misogyny) is one of the many tools of our
patriarchal social, economic and political structure. For example, black men, like
women of all races, suffer from systemic discrimination in education and employ
ment, as well as physical and psychic violence. So while the abortion of fetuses identi
fied as black and male could be understood as challenging patriarchal political and
social institutions, it could also be understood as a response to the devaluation of
black men and boys in our society and as facilitating this cultural norm.
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reassess our commitment to the rhetoric of abortion on demand and
to consider which values we sincerely want to advance. 114
III.

THE PRIVACY DOCTRINE

. . . appell,ant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and
that she is entitl,ed to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever
way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree.
-Justice Bl,ackmun, Rne v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

A.

The 01,d Guard: Constitutional llight to Abortion

The Supreme Court first articulated the right to privacy, as ap
plied to contraception, pregnancy, and abortion, in Griswol,d v. Con
necticut.115 The Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute
which prohibited the sale to and use of contraceptive devices by mar
ried couples. 116 The Griswol,d Court reasoned that a right to privacy
was inherent in the marriage relationship and included the right to
decide about the use of contraception. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the
Court later expanded this right to privacy in contraception to include
single people as well. 117 These decisions sexved as the constitutional
basis for the Court's decisions in Rne v. Wade118 and its companion
case, Doe v. Bolton. n 9 In these cases, the Supreme Court prohibited
the criminalization of most abortions. In Rne, the Court articulated a
right to privacy "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 120 While neither Rne nor
Doe guarantees women access to abortion on demand, 121 both cases
114. Feminists have begun to develop analyses regarding feminine and feminist
methods of ethical reasoning. Examples of this work include: CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (Gilli
gan refers to an "ethic of care" under which non-violence, relationships, responsibility
for self and others, compassion, and self-sacrifice influence women's reasoning and
decision-making); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342 (1980)
("Maternal thinking" refers to the union ofreflection,judgment, and emotion. Intel
lectual activities are distinguishable, but not separate, from feeling); see also Nancy
Chodorow et al., in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 1990).
115. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. Id. at 485-86. For an analysis of the history of contraception and abortion,
see LINDA GoRDON, WoMAN's BODY, WoMAN's RIGHT: A SocIAL HISTORY OF BmTH
CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976).
117. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). As Justice Brennan stated, "If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453 (empha
sis in original).
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
121. Id. at 154, 155; Doe, 410 U.S. at 189; see also Planned Parenthood of South
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826 (1992) (even the broadest read
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clearly state that in the first and second trimesters women must be
free to consider the circumstances of their lives that would make the
birth of a child physically or emotionally undesirable. The Court in
!We reasoned:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent ...
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the un
wanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically or otherwise, to care for it ...
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician nec
essarily will consider in consultation. 1 22

Due to these factors, the majority in !We seems to have recognized
a woman's right to abort a non-viable fetus as a fundamental right.12s
The Court reasoned that the state's interest in preserving potential
human life and protecting maternal health is not sufficiently compel
ling to justify the prohibition of abortion in the first and second tri
mesters of a pregnancy. 124 The Court found that only during the
third trimester, at the point of fetal viability, is the state's interest com
pelling enough to justify regulation of the abortion right. 125
!We, however was not without its problems. The Court also struc
tured the abortion right as the right of a physician to perform a medi
cal procedure, thus upholding abortion both as a woman's right to
choose whether to continue a pregnancy, and as the physician's right
to make a medical decision for his 126 patient.
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the
points where important state interests provide compellingjustifica
tions for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in
all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. 127
ing of Roe does not suggest that there is a constitutional right to abortion on
demand).
122. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
123. Id. at 153, 155.
124. Id. at 163, 164.
125. Id. at 163-64. Although the Court held that at no point may the state pro
hibit abortion where the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
pregnant woman, the Court in Roe held that the state's interest in the preservation of
maternal health is sufficiently compelling after the first trimester of pregnancy. After
the first trimester, the state "may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health." Id. at 163.
126. According to the American Medical Association, seventy-seven percent of all
obstetrician/gynecologists are male. AMERICAN MEDICAL AssoCIATION, DEPARTMENT
OF PHYSICIAN DATA SERVICES, Characteristics ofPhysicians, Table 4 (Jan. l, 1990).
127. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66. The Court's trimester analysis suggests it foresaw
the role of physicians in decision-making as involving, according to physician's judg
ment, the best interest of the pregnant woman's health. Although the Court fashions
the abortion right/decision as a joint decision of the pregnant woman and her physi
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As Ellen Wright Clayton and other scholars have noted, the Court's
conclusion that the abortion decision be made by two people is a posi
tion that utterly contrasts the general rhetoric incorporated in in
formed consent cases, that the patient is the one who decides whether
or not a medical procedure is to be performed. The power that the
Court gives to the physician is not warranted. As Clayton states, "It is
certainly clear that decisions whether or not to continue a pregnancy
usually involve value judgements for which doctors have no particular
claim to expertise. Furthermore, this formulation of two party deci
sion-making grants physicians and the institution of medicine unusual
power over the destiny ofwomen." 128 Moreover, the abortion right in
R.oe was conceived of, and constructed, as a negative right, allowing
the Court to articulate the right without ensuring a constitutional
right to access abortion services. For example, the Court has continu
ously held that the state's or federal government's denial of funding
of abortions for indigent women is permissible because these denials:
place no obstacles absolute or othenvise in the pregnant woman's
path to an abortion.. An indigent woman who desires an abortion
suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision
to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on pri
vate sources for the seIVices she desires. The state may have made
childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the wo
man's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abor
tions that was not already there. 129
clan, I am not sure how important this construction is to women's choice or access to
abortion. Physicians are ethically disinclined from encouraging elective surgical pro
cedures on patients (but see cases regarding forced sterilizations), and as a colleague
pointed out, except where the woman is coerced or otherwise forced by friends, fam
ily members, or her lover, it is always up to the pregnant woman to schedule the
appointment for the abortion, as well as show up at the appointed hour.
128. Ellen Wright Clayton, Women & Advances in Medical Technologies: The Legal
Issues, in WOMEN & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: MEDICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL,
LEGAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS 89, 96 (Judith Radin & Aila Collins eds., 1991).
129. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); see also Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980). In
Webster, the challenged Missouri law prohibited inter alia the use of public employees
and public hospitals to perform even privately paid abortion services that were not
necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman. The Court held that like the stat
utes and federal regulations at issue in Maher and McRae, the Missouri statute was
simply another way in which the state may permissibly encourage childbirth over
abortion. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20. The Missouri law also includes: 1) a legislative
finding that life begins at conception; 2) mandatory viability tests to be performed
after 20 weeks gestation to determine whether or not the fetus is viable; and 3) the
prohibition of the use of public employees or facilities to counsel women about the
option of abortion. See also Rust v. Sullivan, lll S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (extended state's
right to articulate preference for childbirth by prohibiting clinics receiving federal
Title X monies from counseling clients regarding abortion). It has been estimated
that approximately nventy percent of women in this country who want abortions can
not get them due to poverty or inaccessibility of clinics which are located almost ex
clusively in urban areas. According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, by 1989, 83
percent of counties in the United States had no doctors, clinics, or hospitals that
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Thus, the Court concluded that there was a fundamental distinction
between directly hindering or interfering with a woman's right to ac
cess abortion services, and creating an affirmative obligation of the
government to guarantee that all women could realize that right. By
constructing the abortion right as an individual privacy right and as an
individual private choice in Rne v. Wade, the Court in these later cases
was able to ignore the issues of class and race. Because of poverty,
those women with the fewest options and little to no discretionary re
sources will not be able to exercise their "fundamental right" to
abortion. 130
B.

The New Guard: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey

While the Court in Rne maintained that legislative interference
with unfettered decisionmaking regarding abortion was presumptively
invalid, the Court in Casey abandoned this presumption. The Casey
Court held that only if a regulation places a substantial burden on a
woman's right to have an abortion will it fail to meet a constitutional
challenge. If the regulation is deem~d not to place a substantial or
undue burden on the woman seeking to access abortion services, the
reviewing court must assess the constitutional validity of the regula
tion with a rational relationship review: determining whether the
state's regulation is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest
in preserving potential life. 131 In Casey, abortion clinics and physi
cians challenged, on due process grounds, the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania abortion statute which included the following: a
mandatory 24-hour waiting period; an informed consent provision, re
quiring a physician to deliver a government-directed litany of informa
tion including the availability of additional information providing in
great detail the fetus' development, the possibility of state-funded pre
natal care, and the liability of the man who impregnated the woman
would perform abortions. BERNICE Lorr, WOMEN'S LIVES: THEMES AND VARIATIONS IN
GENDER LEARNING 200 (2d ed. 1994).
130. As Rosalind Petchesky notes:
the denial of a collective or social basis of women's need and right of access
to abortion, its portrayal as a 'private choice' rather than a condition of a
decent life, serves to perpetuate class divisions among women. In a class-di
vided society, leaving individuals to their own private resources to secure a
right means inevitably to exclude those who lack the resources.
PETCHESKY, supra note 16, at 295; see generally Lorr, supra note 129, at 289-302.
131. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820, 2821. Justice O'Connor first suggested this stan
dard in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453
(1983) [hereinafter Akron 1] (O'Connor,]. dissenting); see also O'Connor's opinions
in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproduc
tive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) [hereinafter Akron fl]; Webster, 492 U.S. 490. In
Akron I Justice O'Connor stated that a statute imposes an undue burden only if it
imposes absolute obstacles or severe limitations. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 464 (O'Connor,
]., dissenting). She has since moderated her position.
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for child support; parental consent for minors; a reporting require
ment which required information about each abortion to be reported
to the state; and a spousal notification provision.132
While calling abortion a fundamental right, 133 the Court in Casey
destroyed the protections it had previously required. 134 The Court
rejected the trimester system of Rne, despite the fact that the Court in
Rne v. Wade did not simply declare that abortion is a fundamental
right, but also set up "a structure designed to protect that right from
regulatory burdens that do not have a compellingjustification." 135 In
stead, the majority held that the trimester framework articulated in
Rne was "a rigid prohibition on all pre-viability regulation aimed at the
protection of fetal life." 136 The Court found that the trimester frame
work "misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and
in practice it undervalues the State's interest in potential life." 137 The
State, according to the court in Casey, has a substantial interest in the
potential life of the fetus throughout the pregnancy. 138 By rejecting
the trimester structure, "Casey departed significantly enough from Rne
to lessen its vaunted 'legitimacy.' Casey can be seen as just the kind of
unprincipled politically opportune decision making made 'unnecessa
rily and under pressure' that the majority claimed it wanted to
avoid." 139
In rejecting the structure of protections set up by the Court in
Rne, the Casey Court not only rejected the protections afforded by the
trimester analysis of Rne, but also rejected the application of strict scru
tiny traditionally applied in cases concerning fundamental rights.
Strict scrutiny requires that the regulation in question be strictly nec
essary to promote a compelling governmental interest. The Casey
Court rejected this standard in favor of an intermediate form of re
view. The Court's intermediate review is structured as an undue bur
den test which questions whether a state regulation has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek
132. See 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1990) -Appendix to Opinion in Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2833-38.
133. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. Fundamental rights are rights that the Court
deems to be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" so that "neither liberty norjustice would exist if they were
sacrificed." Anita L. Allen, Autonomy'$ Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpre
tation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 683, 687 (1992); see also Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
134. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2818.
135. Rhonda Copelon, From Rhetoric to Reality: The Challenge of Casey, in REFLEc.
TIONS AFrER CAsEY: WOMEN LOOK AT THE STATUS OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA
9, 10 (Center for Constitutional Rights 1993).
136. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2805.
139. Allen, supra note 133, at 685 (footnotes omitted).
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ing the abortion of a non-viable fetus. 140 The court stated, "A statute
with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the state to
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it." 141 An undue burden, as concep
tualized by Justice O'Connor "is one that has a 'severe' or 'drastic'
impact on the availability of legal abortion or absolutely vetoes a wo
man's choice." 142
By significantly overruling the basic structures and prophesies of
Roe, the Casey Court answered the previously unanswered question of
"when is a fundamental right not a fundamental right?" 143 The an
swer is, when the fundamental right is abortion. Hence, regulations
designed to foster the health of the pregnant woman or to persuade
her to choose childbirth instead of abortion are valid unless they erect
a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the woman's right to choose
abortion. 144 Under this new constitutional framework, regulations
that do not unduly burden a woman's right to access abortion services
but rather are designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over
abortion are analyzed under the reasonable relationship standard. 145
140. Martha Field has argued that the "establishment of this new constitutional
framework with which to evaluate the constitutionality of abortion regulation" is prob
ably the most significant holding of Casey. See Martha Field, Abortion Law Today, 14].
LEGAL MED. 3, 12-13 (1993).
The "unduly burdensome" standard of the Court seems to be more conclusory
than a clearly articulated analytical framework. In their 1991 article, Mediating the
Polar Extremes: A Guide to Post-Webster Policy, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 403, 440, Richard
Wilkins, Richard Sherlock, and Steven Clark speculated that three factors would influ
ence the Court's decision of whether an abortion regulation is unduly burdensome.
Wilkins et al. posit that in order for a regulation to avoid being found unduly burden
some: (1) it must be firmly grounded in an articulated state interest; (2) it must not
completely bar access to abortion services; and (3) it must actually further the articu
lated state interest. Many scholars have argued that the unduly burdensome standard
is inherently unworkable. Elizabeth A. Schneider, for example, asserts that the new
standard is unworkable because it "invite[s] courts to ground their decisions in
judges' subjective analysis. This becomes especially problematic when judges have
limited knowledge about the availability of abortion" and because the test fails to
assess each woman's individual needs in the unique situation of an abortion. Eliza
beth A. Schneider, supra note 72, at 1031-34.
141. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480
(Kennedy,]. concurring in part and dissenting in part); 455 (Stevens,]., dissenting)
(both noting that two-parent notification is not significantly burdensome); 460
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
142. Law, Abortion Compromise, supra note 76, at 924; Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
143. See PatriciaJ. Williams, Court Speak: When is a Fundamental Right Not a Funda
mental Right?, Vlll.AGE VOICE, July 14, 1992 at 40.
144. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821; see also Justice O'Connor's opinion in Akron v.
Akron Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (O'Connor,]., dissenting).
145. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
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C.

Casey and the Prohibition of Sex-Se'lective Abartion

What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision,· not a
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. &gulation which does no
more than create a structural mechanism Uy which the state . . . may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a
substantial obstac'le to the woman's exercise of the right to choose.
-Justice 0 'Connor, PluraHty Opinion,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
In Casey, the Court once again reiterated that in the context of an
abortion, the state has an interest in the potentiality of the life of the
fetus. In reiterating this principle, the Court defined the state's inter
est in the life of the fetus as "substantial," ~lowing the state to regulate
abortion so long as the purpose or effect of the statute does not place
a "substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
a non-viable fetus. 1 46 Thus, the state may enact measures that are
designed to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion
even if those measures are solely "persuasive" in nature and in no way
further a health interest. 147 However, the state may use only those
means "calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder
it. "148 In applying the undue burden standard in Casey, the Court
held that all of the challenged provisions, save one, passed constitu
tional muster.
In upholding the informed consent provision of the Pennsylvania
statute, and overruling its earlier decisions in Akron v. Akron Centerfor
Reproductive Health149 and Thornburgh v. American Col'lege of Obstetricians
and Gynecowgists, 150 the Casey Court found that the informed consent
provision of the Pennsylvania statute furthers a legitimate state goal
"of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to
discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed." 151 As long as the information that
the state requires to be made available to the woman is not mislead
ing, the statute does not amount to an undue burden to a woman
seeking an abortion. 152 Consequently, as Anita Allen noted, Casey car
ries on the process of dismissing the First Amendment rights of wo
men seeking abortions and abortion providers by mandating what
abortion providers must say to their patients. 1 53
146. Id. at 2820.
147. Id. at 2825.
148. Id. at 2820.
149. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
150. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
151. Case;, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
152. Id. at 2824. The Court's analysis here seems to follow the scheme presented
by Wilkins, Sherlock, and Clark in their 1991 article. See supra note 140.
153. The process of dismissing women's First Amendment rights in reference to
abortion began with the Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan. See discussion infra pp.
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The relevant constitutional question in the context of sex-selec
tive abortion is whether the state may forbid a woman from having
access to certain information - namely the sex of her fetus - or
forbid the consideration of this information, when she is deciding
whether to obtain an abortion. 154 In other words, would a prohibition
on sex-selective abortion be an undue burden on the exercise of a
woman's right to choose, given that such a prohibition would exclude
the consideration of information that she deems relevant? Would
such a measure be calculated to inform the woman's individual choice
or to impede it?l55
1.

Restricting Knowledge of the Fetus' Sex

In upholding the informed consent provision of the statute, the
Court in Casey held that a state could require a woman to take certain
information into account when deciding whether to obtain an abor
tion. This decision seems to be in line with some of the principles of
our First Amendmentjurisprudence, which disregards free speech im
plications of state abortion restrictions. 156 Information is deemed a
benefit: the more information the better. The Court stresses that in
formational requirements lead to better decisions for all women. 157
Earlier, however, in Rust v. Sullivan15B the Court upheld as consti
tutional a federal regulation which forbade physicians or other em
ployees of family planning clinics that received Title X159 funds from
counseling pregnant patients about the option of abortion. 160 The
regulation, no longer in effect, limited many poor women's access to
abortion information, but was not viewed by the Court as impermissi
bly restricting the "speech" of the physicians, other clinic employees,
or their pregnant patients, by imposing viewpoint discriminatory con
ditions on government subsidies, or impermissibly restricting a wo
man's right to procure abortion services. According to the Court, the
regulation was constitutional because physicians remained free to
counsel patients about abortion outside of the government-funded
clinic and because all women are "free" to obtain advice and counsel
ing from a physician or other health care worker not restricted by the
194-96; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowl.edge, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993); Allen, supra note 133, at 691-92.
154. See discussion of Pennsylvania and Illinois statutes supra p. 163-64.
155. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
156. See Allen, supra note 133, at 691-92.
157. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
158. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
159. Title X of the Public Health SeIVice Act, 84 Stat. 1506, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6, provides federal funding for family planning seIVices. Section
1008 of the Act provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this sub
chapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1989).
160. Regulation Governing Grants for Family Planning SeIVices, 42 C.F.R
§§ 59.2, 59.8, 59.10 (1988).
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regulation. With regard to the free speech rights of physicians and
other clinic employees, the Court stated:
Individuals who are voluntarily employed for a Title X project must
perform their duties in accordance with the regulation's restrictions
on abortion counseling and referral. The employees remain free,
however, to pursue abortion-related activities when they are not act
ing under the auspices of the Title X project. ... The employees'
freedom of expression is limited during the time that they actually
work for the project; but this limitation is a consequence of their
decision to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is
permissibly restricted by the funding authority.161

The Court in Rust reasoned that because the restrictions did not affect
all women and physicians, but only those who relied on the govern
ment subsidized clinics, and because this reliance was due solely to the
woman's poverty or to the physician's choice of employment - "ob
stacles" not of the government's making - these restrictions did not
unduly burden the woman's choice. 162 Moreover, the Court stressed
that the regulation at issue was just another way by which the govern
ment may " 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,
and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds.' "163 This allocation of resources, the Court reasoned, is not
viewpoint discrimination; rather, it is merely the encouragement of
one activity to the exclusion of another.164.
Denying access to full information concerning her fetus may be
viewed as burdensome by a woman who wishes to factor the sex of her
fetus into her abortion decision. However, application of the undue
burden standard as articulated in Casey would probably yield a verdict
of no "undue" burden or substantial obstacle. By not allowing a wo
man to factor the sex of the fetus into her decision, or to abort on the
basis of the sex of her fetus, or by blocking her access to sex informa
tion gathered by amniocentesis or CVS, the State would not be plac
ing obstacles in the path of a woman who wishes to have an abortion.
The woman would still be permitted to abort her fetus; she would only
be unable to factor the sex of her fetus into the decision. 165 Prohibit
ing access to fetal sex information could be simply another way in
161. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775.
162. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315, 317;
Maher v. Rne, 432 U.S. 464, 474. President Clinton responded to this "gag rule" with
"The Title X 'Gag Rule' Memorandum for the Secretary of Health and Human Serv
ices," January 22, 1993, which removed the restrictions from family planning clinics
receiving Title X funds.
163. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
164. Id.
165. John Schaibley makes this point in his analysis of Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). Schaibley, supra note 10, at 303 ("A state regulation
of abortion is not constitutionally infirm merely because it makes the abortion deci
sion more difficult. Indeed the informed consent requirement upheld in Danforth
was designed to influence a woman's abortion decision and could discourage a wo
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which the state may permissibly encourage childbirth over abortion:
that is, by effectively discouraging women from aborting in fear that
they will mistakenly abort a fetus of the "correct" sex.
Yet, would such a statute or regulation be "calculated to inform
the woman's free choice," as required by the Court in Casey, or
designed to hinder the exercise of free choice? 166 The statute at issue
in Casey, as construed by the Court, was designed to "create a struc
tural mechanism by which the State ... may express profound respect
for the life of the [fetus] ," 167 and to persuade the pregnant woman to
choose childbirth over abortion. 168 The Court found the informed
consent provision constitutional because the measure did not create a
"substantial obstacle" to the exercise of her right of choice. The wo
man could still choose abortion, so there is no hinderance of her ex
ercise of "free choice." 169 By "choice," the Court seems to refer to
whether or not the regulation creates a substantial obstacle to ob
taining an abortion somewhere. 170 "Choice" does not mean that the
pregnant woman has at her disposal as much or as little information
as she wants. Clearly, the lesson of Casey and Rust is that the state can
regulate what types of information, if any, pregnant women receive
regarding abortion. Pregnant women may be given too much infor
mation - designed to encourage them to choose childbirth - or no
information - again designed to encourage them to choose child
birth. As long as the pregnant woman still has the "choice" ofwhether
or not to abort, the quality and amount of the information she re
ceives is constitutionally unimportant. The State may prevent sex-se
lective abortions by prohibiting doctors from informing pregnant
women and their partners of the fetus' sex if the doctors know that
the information is sought for the purposes of sex-selection. This type
of regulation could be viewed as a means of "encouraging" childbirth
over abortion (that is, because the state believes that women who want
sex-selective abortion will not abort for fear of aborting the wanted
sex). A prohibition of this type would not act as an obstacle to the
"ultimate decision" of whether to abort. 17 1
man from having an abortion, but the Court did not consider this an undue
burden.").
166. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
167. Id. at 2821.
168. Id. at 2824.
169. In Rust, the Court held that the "gag rule" at issue did not impermissibly
burden a woman's constitutional right to abortion because the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not confer an affirmative right to govern
mental aid. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
170. Similarly, the Court in Rust reasoned that women's due process rights were
not violated by the agency's regulations because "a woman's right to receive informa
tion concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Ti
tle X project remains unfettered." Id. at 1777.
171. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
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2. The Mandatory Waiting Period and the Spousal
Notification Requirements
The Court in Casey also analyzed the Pennsylvania law's twenty
four hour waiting period provision, which required a woman seeking
an abortion to wait uventy-four hours after the required information is
furnished to her. The Court held that the provision did not cause an
undue burden and, hence, was a constitutionally permissible provi
sion. In contrast, the spousal notification provision, which required a
pregnant woman to notify her spouse of her decision to abort her
fetus, was held unduly burdensome and therefore unconstitutional.
With regard to the uventy-four hour waiting period, the Court found
that the waiting period was a "reasonable measure to implement the
State's interest in protecting the life of the [fetus]," 172 despite the fact
that the regulation would cause hardships to women who had to travel
a great distance to the abortion provider, forcing them to explain
their whereabouts to husbands, employers and others; increase the
costs and the risk of delay of abortions; and pose the greatest burden
on women who had the fewest financial resources. 173 The Court held
that the district court's findings of fact, that the waiting period was
"particularly burdensome," did not include a finding that the in
creased costs and potential delays amount to "substantial obstacles" to
abortion: 174
We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the "par
ticularly burdensome" effects of the waiting period on some women
require its invalidation. A particular burden is not of necessity a
substantial obstacle. Whether a burden falls on a particular group is
a distinct inquiry from whether it is a substantial obstacle even as to
the women in that group. And the District Court did not conclude
that the waiting period is such an obstacle even for the women who
are the most burdened by it. 1 7 5

The Court thereby maintained that although poor women in Penn
sylvania may be foreclosed from having an abortion, the mandatory
172. Id. at 2825. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted the District Court's find
ings that requiring a doctor, rather than an assistant, to give the patient the requisite
informed consent materials increased the cost of the abortion, making it even more
financially burdensome for poor women. Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part); see also Schneider, supra
note 72, at 1024-25 ("increased cost of the physician-only requirement literally puts
abortion out of [poor women's] financial reach"}.
173. The District Court found that the twenty-four hour waiting period was "par
ticularly burdensome." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
744 F.Supp. 1323, 1352 (1990).
174. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
175. Id. at 2825-26. The Supreme Court in Casey did not explain why there is a
significant difference between a finding of "particularly'' burdensome as found by the
District Court, and "especially" or "substantially" burdensome as required by the
Court. Of course, the District Court could not have known that the "magic words"
were going to be "unduly burdensome".
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waiting period "merely makes abortions a little more difficult or expen
sive to obtain. "176 Hence, it is not the waiting period that causes the
obstacle and forecloses access to abortion services for poor women,
but their poverty. It is poor women's lack of financial resources that
makes them unable to effectuate this right.177
At first glance, the Court's analysis of Pennsylvania's mandatory
waiting period, as well as the Court's decisions in analogous abortion
funding cases, is supported by the theoretical underpinnings of pri
vacy and the Court's autonomy rhetoric. The abortion right is con
ceived as a purely personal or individual right. The funding cases, as
well as the Court's decision regarding the mandatory waiting periods
in Casey, seem to logically extend this understanding of liberty - as
rights that are exercised solely by the citizen using the citizen's own
resources. As Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz have noted, "[abor
tion] is a private decision in a dual sense: the state cannot interfere
and the woman cannot invoke state aid." 178 But if Karlan and Ortiz
are correct in their assessment of the Court's conceptualization of the
liberty interest, then if the state is permitted to interfere with the wo
man's autonomy and her decisionmaking, the woman should be able
to invoke more state resources to protect her interests. The Court's
opinion in Casey clearly allows for increased state intervention in a
pregnant woman's decision to abort her fetus. The decreased level of
constitutional scrutiny permits more state intervention. After Casey
the abortion decision is no longer a private one - the state signifi
cantly interferes inter alia by prescribing waiting periods and informa
tional requirements. Accordingly, the woman should be able to
depend on state assistance in securing access to the right, particularly
given that the state has forced the woman to spend more of her re
sources to exercise her rights. I doubt that the Court's abortion juris
prudence will confront this theoretical inconsistency, but this
inconsistency is further evidence of the Court's politically opportune
decision making. 179
Regarding the spousal notification provision, the Court relied on
the overwhelming data of domestic violence against women in the
United States, and held the spousal notification provision unconstitu
tional because it is likely to prevent a significant number of women
from obtaining abortions. The Court believed that this provision
176. Id. at 2829 (emphasis added).
177. In a post-Casey abortion case, the Court has tried to flesh out the parameters
of the undue burden standard. For example, in Fargo Women '.s Health Organization v.
Schafer, Justice O'Connor in her concurrence noted that the Court in Casey "made
clear that a law restricting abortions is invalid, if 'in a large fraction of cases in which
[the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice.'"
Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism,
Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. R.E.v. 858, 879 (1993).
179. See, Williams, supra note 143, at 40.
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"[did] not make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to ob
tain; for many women, it imposed a substantial obstacle." 180 Although
the State argued that the provision would affect only 1 percent of the
women who obtain abortions in the Commonwealth of Penn
sylvania, 181 the Court found this fact insignificant, noting that the
"proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law
is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. "182 The
Court suggested that the number of actual women who will be bur
dened by the statute is inconsequential, so long as a large fraction of
the relevant group of women will be unduly burdened. Nevertheless,
the Court did not use this reasoning when applying its new standard
to the mandatory waiting period. 183 Instead, the Court declared that
although the opportunity for access by large numbers of women may
be foreclosed as a result of the waiting period, the waiting period was
not unduly burdensome because it only increased the external costs.
Hence the Court's substantial burden test is both inconsistent and
contradictory. It appears that what is required is the formalistic decla
ration by the district court that the particular burden, falling on a
particular group of women, is a substantial obstacle1 8 4 and that the
obstacle is not caused by poverty or other financial constraints. By
defining the obstacle posed by the mandatory waiting period as solely
financial, 185 the Court disregards the fact that many women will be
unable to receive abortions due to the restrictions.
3. Casey and Sex-Selective Abortion
The remaining issues are whether the Court's analysis in Casey
relates to the issue of sex-selective abortion and whether the Court
may (or is likely to) allow states to limit women's access to information
concerning fetal sex. In Casey, the social science data relied upon by
the Court in testing the constitutionality of the spousal notification
provision was statistical evidence about the abuse of women by their
spouses which has already occurred and continues to occur. The
abuse has already been "proven." In contrast, the sociological data
regarding sex-selective abortion speaks to predictions which can only
be "proven" or "unproven" at some time in the future. In other
words, the validity of sociological predictions is indeterminate. Inde
180. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
181. Brief for Robert Casey at 83-86, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn
sylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
182. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
183. Id. at 2829-30. The meaning of "large fraction" and "relevant group" are
unclear, and as a result, manipulatable. See id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J. concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2877 (Scalia,
]., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
184. See id. at 2819-20. (Court's re-writing of district court's "particularly burden
some" finding.)
185. See Court's discussion in Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17 and Maher, 432 U.S. at
474.
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terminate speculative outcomes are discountable by the Court. 186 If
the new doctrine articulated by the Court in Casey requires that the
state regulation of abortion must actually further the articulated state
interest, as Wilkins, Sherlock and Clark suggest, 187 then the sociologi
cal predictions fall short of that standard.
In Casey, the Court seemed to give weight to "external" obstacles
which are not economic in nature. In discussing the spousal notifica
tion provision, the Court seriously considered and deemed relevant
the ways in which some social conditions, such as domestic violence,
affect a woman's ability to access the right to abortion. The Court was
swayed by the district court's findings regarding the prevalence of
spouse abuse. 188 That a "significant number of women who fear for
their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred
from procuring an abortion" if they are required to notify their
spouses, constitutes a substantial burden. 189 Like the sociological data
on spouse abuse, the sociological data concerning sex-selective abor
tion is not based on the issues of class or the availability of financial
resources. After Casey, the question remains whether the analysis of
what constitutes a "substantial" obstacle examines the conditions
under which a decision is made, like the mandatory waiting period
and the spousal notification provision, or looks at what motivates the
decision itself. 190
Although the right of privacy with regard to abortion can mean
the protection of one's sovereignty over personal decisions, 191 the pri
vacy doctrine provides an inadequate basis for understanding abor
tion decisions generally and sex-selective abortion in particular. The
privacy doctrine argues for the support of abortion on the basis of
freedom from unwarranted state intrusion in one's sphere of individ
ual discretion. It does not argue for abortion on the basis of womens'
right to reproductive control, 192 bodily integrity, freedom of sexual
expression, or the right to equality. By operating in the realm of the
private sphere, the privacy doctrine obscures the political nature of
the private sphere1 93 where women are often beaten, raped or other
wise sexually coerced, including coerced into producing male chil
186. See supra note 86.
187. See supra note 140.
188. The District Court's findings were based on the testimony of numerous ex
perts at the trial and other studies of domestic violence which demonstrate that a
significant number of married women are physically and emotionally abused by their
spouses. Casey, 744 F.Supp. at 1332-33.
189. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
190. See]oN EI.STER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SocIAL SCIENCES 13-21 (1989).
191. Ronald Dworkin, Feminism and Abortion, N.Y. REv. BooKS 27, 27 (June 10,
1993).
192. But see Court's opinion in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
193. But see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806. (Court implies that the abortion right is
based on the notion that states have a limited ability to interfere in basic decisions
about family and parenthood, as well as the bodily integrity of the pregnant woman.).
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dren for their husbands and farnilies. 194 This conception of nghts
protects behavior that is arbitrary or even InJUnous provided that the
mJunous behavior falls m the protected sphere. 195 In the context of
abortion for the purpose of sex-selection, the pnvacy nghts doctnne
does not take mto account the harms done to women's mdividual or
social goals of gender equality.
IV

FEMINSIMS AND EQUAL PROTECI'ION APPROACHES

To

SEX-SELECI'ION

I will never be in a man's place, a man will never be in mine. Whateoer
the possibl,e identifications, one will never exactly occupy the p!,ace of the
other - they are irreducibl,e the one to the other.
-LUCE IRIGARAY, ETHIQ.llE .DE LA .DIFFERENCE SEXllELLE

19-20 (1984).

Fermmsts are not a homogeneous group even though we are all
gmded by similar moral and philosophical pnnc1ples and share the
goals of gender equality and JUStice. Hence, there is no smgle fem1
mst analysis of any polittcal, legal, or social issue, mcluding sex-selec
ttve abortion. In this sectton I shall discuss the tradittonal approach of
the equal protectton doctnne to issues related to women's biological
difference from men and fermmst proposals of alternattve equal pro
tectton approaches. I shalll also analyze liberal and radical femm1st
evaluattons of sex-selecttve abortion under these alternattve equal pro
tectton frameworks.

A Note on Traditional Equal Protection Analysis
Fermmst scholars from across the polittcal spectrum have cntt
c1zed tradittonal equal protectton doctnne because of its failure to
protect women from the harms of many gender-based discnrmnatory
laws which mvolve women's capacity to become pregnant, gestate the
fetus, or termmate a pregnancy. Traditional equal protectton analysis
seeks to treat alike those who are alike, and allow differenttal treat
ment of those who are not similarly situated. Since women are not
like men when it comes to true biological differences, such as the abil
ity to conceive and bear children, laws that treat women differently
often pass constttutional muster under the tradittonal analysis. 1 96 The
A.

194. See generally SuSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OuR WILL. MEN, WOMEN, AND
RAPE (1975).
195. See generally, ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 7
(1986).
196. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1973), is a pnme example of the Court's
reasoning on the issue of gender equality and the equal protectton doctnne. At issue
m Geduldigwas a California disability insurance program which covered workers tem
porarily disabled by illness or Injury. Electtve surgery was covered under the policy, as
were disabilities umque to men, but disability related to a normal pregnancy was not.
The Court held that the program was not 1mpermissibly discnminatory under the
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goal of traditional equal protection analysis is assimilation: to the ex
tent that women are able to be like men (since the standard for equal
treatment is maleness), 197 they are similarly situated and therefore
should be treated equally - not discriminated against. 198 Under this
test, the biological fact that women get pregnant and men do not
equal protection clause. The Court concluded that there was no risk from which
women were protected and men were not. Id. at 496-97. The majority insisted that
the California program did not exclude anyone from eligibility for benefits because of
their gender, but rather "merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from
the list of compensable disabilities," dividing potential recipients in two groups: preg
nant women and nonpregnant persons. Id. at 496 n.20. Cf. Michael M. v. Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (Statutory rape law effectively allowed men to legally
engage in sexual intercourse at an earlier age than women based on notion that con
sequences of sexual intercourse for women is different).
By allowing the California disability program to cover disabilities that were male
gender specific while not covering pregnancy, a condition that is female gender spe
cific, the Court implicitly declared that the standard is male. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at
497 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In other words, the Court's acceptance of the insur
ance program which covered conditions that were specifically male, such as circumci
sions, and not pregnancy, is indicative of the Court's use of men as the standard to
which others are compared when deciding issues of equality and equal protection. See
generally Ann Scales, Toward a Feminist jurisprudence, 56 IND. LJ. 375, 435 (1981) (uni
queness of women is a trap in equal protection analysis which assumes maleness as a
norm); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984) (pregnancy has been
negatively treated because it is an ascension into "no man's land." Normal-male
like-status for women is non-pregnant).
After the Court announced its decisions in Geduldig, and a factually similar Title
VII case, General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), Congress passed the Preg
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(K) (1982), which prohibited this
type of discrimination under Title VII; but note, Geduldig is still good constitutional
law. For a fuller analysis of this issue see, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Women 'S Subordination and the Role of Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN'S SuBORDINA·
TION AND THE ROLE OF LAw (David Kairys ed., 1990) (Taub and Schneider note that in
Michael M., "the Court's focus on the physical fact of reproductive capacity serves to
obscure the social bases of its decision. Indeed, it is striking that the Court entirely
fails to treat pregnancy as sex-discrimination when discrimination really is in issue,
while using it as a rationale in order to justify differential treatment when it is not in
issue.").
197. Catharine MacKinnon makes this point when she states:
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our corre
spondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his measure.
Under the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of
correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his
measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard ... Approach
ing sex discrimination in this way-as if sex questions are difference ques
tions and equality questions are sameness questions-provides two ways for
the law to hold women to a male standard and call that sex equality.
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMI
NISM UNMODIFIED 34 (1987).
198. See ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAw 66-67 (1988);
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, THE SEXUAL lIARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CAsE OF
SEx DISCRIMINATION (1979) [hereinafter SEXUAL lIARAssMENT]; CATHARINE A. MAcKIN
NON, FEMINISM UNMODIDED (1987).
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makes discrimination permissible. Hence, laws biased against preg
nant women are not viewed as gender discrimination; instead, they
have been understood as laws that are neutral. 199 In the context of
reproduction, the sexes are not similarly situated and thus equal pro
tection and treatment principles simply are not applicable. 200 In addi
tion, under its current equal protection jurisprudence, the Court
ignores the "context" of discrimination based on women's capacity to
reproduce. Historically, legislation limiting women's rights regarding
reproduction, including abortion, have been enmeshed in society's
conception of women as mothers. 201 Equal protection seeks to either
impose generality in law or to correct for generalities in law that im
pede individuals from exercising discretion in determining the course
of their lives.202 It does not seek to correct for trends in social prac
tices that tend to pose difficulties for individuals or groups based on
commonly held views about them. Hence, by validating differential
and discriminatory treatment toward women as a result of women's
capacity for childbearing, and confusing the differences between wo
men's biological difference from men and the gendered expectations
society holds for women, the Court continues to legitimize gender ine
quality. Due to its foundational structures and philosophy, traditional
equal protection analysis is inadequate to address the issue of sex-se
lective abortion.
B. Feminist Approaches to the Equal Protection Clause

Many feminist scholars have rejected the assimilationism of the
traditional model of equal protection, and have instead argued for a
framework which moves closer to the goal of gender equality. They
have rejected the anti-discrimination model of equal protection and
The current level of equal protection review for issues of gender discrimination is
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, which means that the government's regulation
must be substantially related to an important governmental interest. This standard
was first applied in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), a case involving a statute
which permitted women to buy and drink 3.2 percent beer at an earlier age than
men. The statute was struck down under intermediate scrutiny. See generally LAU
RENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1561-65 (2d ed. 1988) (tracing the
development of heightened review standard for gender discrimination).
199. EISENSTEIN, supra note 198, at 66.
200. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 YALE L. REv. 1281, 1287-88 (1991) [hereinafter Reflections on Sex Equality] (issues
of sexual violence and reproduction not considered equal protection issues or issues
of sex inequality by early feminists); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and
Politics: Perspectives from the Women '.s- Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 634-42 (1986)
[hereinafter The Dialectic ofRights and Politics]; Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Qy,estions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 261, 352-53 (1992) [hereinafter Reasoningfrom the Body] (equal protection clause
as currently construed places no restraints on state regulation of women's reproduc
tive lives).
201. See Siegel, supra note 200, at 351; see also RICH, supra note 75 at 41-55.
202. See UNGER, supra note 195, at 44-45.
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have substituted models based on anti-subordination. As Reva Siegel
has noted, a growing number of constitutional scholars have argued
that equal protection analysis should be reoriented "so that it directly
consider[s] the impact of state action on the citizens affected by it." 203
The fundamental principle of feminist equal protection models is this
paradigm shift from anti-discrimination to anti-subordination. The
anti-subordination principle is that women deserve equality and jus
tice whether or not they are like men. The proponents of these mod
els assert that the legal and social discrimination, the differential
treatment that women face, "has left [us] dissimilarly situated from
men with regard to any number of traits typically addressed by dis
criminatory laws. Rather than excusing the differential treatment as
the traditional equal protection doctrine suggests, this disparity is sim
ply another symptom of the discrimination that women face. "2°4
Catharine MacKinnon has developed such a feminist equal pro
tection model. 205 Under her approach, any statute, regulation, rule
or practice which "contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or
a deprived position because of gender status" would be constitution
ally impermissible as a violation of the equal protection clause. 206
Under MacKinnon's analysis:
The social problem addressed is not the failure to ignore woman's
essential sameness with man, but the recognition of womanhood to
woman's comparative disadvantage. In this approach, few reasons,
not even biological ones, can justify the institutionalized disadvan
tage of women. Comparability of sex characteristics is not required
because policies are proscribed which transform women's sex-based
difference from men into social and economic deprivations. All
that is required are comparatively unequal results. 207

Application ofMacKinnon's approach requires an analysis of whether
the law or regulation at issue preserves women's economic, social, and
political subordination.
While many feminist scholars have adopted MacKinnon's ap
proach to equal protection problems, Sylvia Law has criticized it for
improperly presuming that judges will be able to recognize, and find
203. Siegel, supra note 200, at 368. This paradigm shift is often referred to as the
anti-subordination model of equal protection jurisprudence. See infra note 248.
204. Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the Abar
tion Ri,ghts ofMinors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 611 (1993) (citations omitted).
205. MacKinnon first articulated the parameters of the new approach to equal
protection in SEXUAL liARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CAsE OF SEX DISCRIMINA
TION (1979). See also MAcKINNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra
note 105, at 215-34. As Catherine Grevers Schmidt notes, many feminist legal schol
ars have adopted a "MacKinnonesque" equal protection test. See Schmidt, supra note
204, at 617 n.124.
206. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL liARAssMENT, supra note 205, at 117.
207. Id.; see also id. at 127.
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unconstitutional, laws that oppress women. 208 Law is concerned that
MacKinnon's framework unrealistically relies on the subjective and
personal experience of judges to know the oppression of women
when they see it 209 In response, Sylvia Law has created an alternative
feminist equal protection formulation that also focuses on the impact
of the law or regulation at issue. However, her formulation applies
only to laws or regulations that are explicitly based on women's bio
logical difference from men because she believes that such laws are
conceptually similar to the types of racially discriminatory categories
that are judged by means of strict scrutiny analysis under the tradi
tional equal protection doctrine. Pregnancy, like race, is a facial clas
sification.210 Under Law's analysis, the court must ascertain whether
the regulation has a "significant impact in perpetuating either the op
pression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints on indi
vidual freedom" 211 and whether "it is justified as the best means of
serving a compelling state purpose."212 Thus under Law's equal pro
tection test, the state has the burden ofjustifying its law in light of the
history of women's subjugation based on their reproductive capacities
only when the regulation is explicitly based on biological sex. 213 Of
course the problem with this analysis is that it gives women no re
course when the bias they face is due to their gender. Much discrimi
nation against women is based on gender as socially constructed, and
not on biological sex. Indeed, courts and legislatures often confuse
the social construction of women with their biological abilities.21 4
Hence Law's analysis permits much of the bias that women face, par
ticularly in the reproductive arena, to evade an equal protection
challenge.

C. A Liberal Feminist Equal Protection Analysis of Sex-Selection
In the United States, classic liberalism has as its foundation the
political principle ofliberty: the right of the individual (read male) to
be free from undue government interference in his personal, familial
and business affairs, except where government interference protects
208. Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1005,
1011 (1984) [hereinafter &thinking Sex and the Constitution].
209. Id. at 1005. Elizabeth A. Schneider makes a similar point in her critique of
the undue burden standard articulated by the Court in Casey, see supra note 72, at
1004, 1031-33.
210. Law, &thinking Sex and the Constitution, supra note 208, at 1008, 1010.
211. This part of Law's analysis is subject to the same criticism that Law makes of
MacKinnon's analysis - that the analysis relies on the same type of subjective analysis
of the judge, and that the regulation at issue oppresses women. Law seeks to cure this
weakness by insisting that all biologically-based laws are presumed to be oppressive to
women. Id. at 1009.
212. Id. at 1008-09.
213. Id. at 1009.
214. See e.g., MacKinnon, &factions on Sex Equality Under Law, supra note 200, at
1308-09; RrCH, supra note 75, at 21-40.
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private property and business interests in the public sphere and male
control of the biological family in the private sphere. Some principles
of liberalism - that is, the worship of individuality and autonomy 
are accepted by women espousing a liberal feminist political position.
The liberal feminist generally accepts the validity of a political theory
which puts a premium on individual power and discretion, but argues
that liberalism, as practiced in the United States, excludes women
from fully realizing these goals. Consequently, the liberal feminist ad
vocates for formal legal equality between men and women, as well as
equal educational, economic, and employment opportunities. Liberal
feminists believe that through legal equality and equal access of op
portunities, women will be provided with the needed opportunities
for full participation in public life as promised by liberal political the
ory. Thus liberal feminism's vision of equality for women is a commit
ment to equality between men and women based on the sameness of
treatment and equal opportunity, without any analysis of the social/
cultural relationship of power that exists between men and women.
As Zillah Eisenstein has written:
The discourse of liberalism, which espouses a commitment to
equality for all individuals, articulates an important and necessary
view regarding the treatment of women. The fact that liberalism
has always privileged the phallus and the social relations of patriar
chal society explains why the tension between women's similarity
(to) and difference (from men) is embodied within liberal law. As a
gendered discourse, liberal law ends up exposing the phallus, be
cause in its view men and women are supposedly homogeneous in
dividuals and not sex classes. Liberalism thus establishes the
expectation that women will be treated as individuals, not as wo
men, classified by their sex. 2 15

In the reproductive arena, liberal feminists advocate for repro
ductive liberty on the grounds of personal autonomy (again a founda
tional aspect of classic liberalism) and the protection of privacy, that
is, freedom from unwarranted government intrusion into the private
sphere.2 16 As a result, liberal feminists argue against legal prohibi
215. EISENSTEIN, supra note 198, at 77 (emphasis in original).
216. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 213-15. J.S. Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill, and Mary Woll
stonecraft are three important figures in the early articulation ofliberal feminism. In
A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WoMAN (Carol H. Poston ed., 1988), Mary Woll
stonecraft, in 1792, argues for the right of women to a quality, equal education. J.S.
Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill in the mid-19th century advocated both formal legal
equality and equal educational opportunities. See, e.g., HAfuuET TAYLOR MILL, EN
FRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN (1851) (advocating equal education; equal access to occu
pations and equal access to public office and public/political life, as well as suffrage);
J.S. Mill & Harriet Taylor, Early Essays on Marriage and Divorce, inJ.S. MILL AND HAR
RIET TAYLOR MILL, ESSAY ON SEX EQUALITY (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970) (advocating mar
riage and divorce reform). Cf. Randy E. Barnett, supra note 67, at 628. Barnett, in
discussing natural rights which is at the heart of liberalism, explains:
For persons to live and pursue happiness in society with others, persons
need to act at their own discretion. This is made possible by recognizing a
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tions on sex-selective abortion. The principles of liberalism and lib
eral feminism demand that each individual woman be permitted to
make choices regarding the continuation of her pregnancy using
whatever criteria she wishes. Prohibitions against sex-selective abor
tion are in conflict with these principles. There is also some concern
in feminist circles across the political spectrum that because the right
to access abortion services is so precarious in the United States, any
prohibitions on the abortion right would irreparably weaken that
right. Feminist philosopher Tabitha Powledge is one scholar who has
forcefully voiced this position: "To make it illegal to use prenatal diag
nostic techniques for sex choice is to nibble away at our hard-won
reproductive control, control that I think most of us believe is the
absolute rock-bottom minimum goal we have got to keep achieved
before we can achieve anything else."217
This view is supported by a consequentialist philosophical ap
proach which focuses on the consequences of a decision to prohibit
abortion for the purpose of sex-selection on both the current and fu
ture generations of women. 218 In this form of consequentialist in
quiry, a good moral decision is one that takes into account the moral
and social consequences of an act. A liberal feminist analysis, adopt
ing a consequentialist philosophical approach, would argue that the
social consequences of a legal prohibition of sex-selective abortion
would be the reinforcment of women's subordinate status and the
denigration of women as irresponsible decisionmakers, which would
"nibble away at our hard won reproductive control." The overriding
consequence of a prohibition on sex-selective abortion according to
liberal feminism would be the constriction of women's autonomy,
which is in direct opposition to liberal feminism's beliefin the impor
tance of preserving legal rules which embody a view of women as re
sponsible adults. 219 As a result, many liberal feminists have turned to
equal protection law as a source of potential protection against any
sphere ofjurisdiction over physical resources - including their own bodies
- that provides persons with discretionary control - liberty - over these
resources. Put another way, persons need to be at liberty to act within the
realm of their jurisdiction - a jurisdiction that has both temporal and spa
tial dimensions.
217. Tabitha M. Powledge, Unnatural Selection: On Choosing Children s Sex, in THE
CUSTOM MADE CHn.o?, supra note 2, 193, at 197; see also WARREN, supra note 4, at 183;
Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, at 245 (sex-selection is simply a more sophisticated
method of family planning and any legal restriction on family planning also jeopar
dizes other aspects of women's precarious reproductive futures); Hetcher, Ethics and
Amnwcentesis for Fetal Sex Identificatron, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 550 (1979), reprinted in 10
HAsnNGs CENTER REP. 15, 15-16 (Feb. 1980) (to employ public or medical tests of
women's decision to abo~ provides opportunities for obstruction and defeat of wo
men's freedom to determine their own reproductive futures).
218. See discussion supra pp. 178-81.
219. For a fuller discussion of consequentialist philosophy see supra pp. 178-81.
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prohibition of the abortion right, 220 including prohibitions on the use
of abortion for sex-selective purposes.
1.

Liberal Feminism and Issues of Moral Agency

In large part, the failure of the legal system to ardently protect
women's reproductive and abortion decisionmaking as equal protec
tion issues stems from our cultural perception ofwomen as irresponsi
ble moral agents who cannot be trusted with such important
decisions. 221 This is evidenced by various state statutes, eventually
held unconstitutional, regarding spousal consent and notification pro
visions in abortion laws. 222 Spousal consent and notification provi
sions, as well as mandatory waiting periods in abortion laws, are
symptomatic of a society that does not believe that pregnant women
will make good choices concerning their fetuses. 22s Such restrictions
demonstrate the cultural assumption that women cannot make repro
ductive decisions without the help or direction of men (or the State
220. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. R:Ev.
1185 (1992); Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Some TJwughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. R:Ev. 375, 382-83, 386 (1985).
221. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. R:Ev. 1774,
1820 (1991) (criminal abortion laws often reflect understanding of women as incapa
ble or irresponsible decisionmakers). This theme of woman as untrustworthy can also
be seen in traditional rape laws. The definition of rape, the concept of consent, and
the burden of proof are all examples of this concept. See Berger et al., The Dimensions
ofRape Reform Legi,slation, 22 LAw & Soc'y R:Ev. 329 (1988) (images ofwomen as seduc
tive and untrustworthy are, under traditional rape laws, combined with socio-legal
conceptions of women as property of males, and produce a wide range of prejudicial
criminal justice system practices in handling rape cases.) MacKinnon also offers some
insight into the law's mistrust of women and its male perspective of the law of rape. I
think that the parallels to abortion law are clear. MacKinnon writes:
It seems to me we have here a convergence between the rapist's view of what
he has done and the victim's perspective on what has been done to her... A
rape victim has to prove that it was not intercourse. She has to show that
there was force and she resisted, because if there was sex, consent was in
ferred. Finders of fact look for 'more force than usual during the prelimina
ries.' Rape is defined by the distinction from intercourse not
nonviolence, intercourse. They ask, does this event look more like fucking
or like rape? But what is their standard for sex, and is this question asked
from the woman '.s- point of view? The level of force is not adjudicated at her
point of violation, it is adjudicated at the standard of the normal level of
force. Who sets this standar&
MAcK!NNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 198, at 88 (emphasis added).
222. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
223. In this context a good choice is one that both favors the status quo of patri
archy and women's disempowerment and one that is morally responsible in the patri
archal moral/ethical framework in which we currently operate. Thus, a good choice
is one that does not threaten men's power or existence. Women could, if they had
the power to make such a decision, abort men out of existence. But instead, because
we lack real social, political or economic power, we are participating in our own
annihilation.
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conceptualized as male).224 Moral agency is, in this context, defined
as autonomous decisionmaking. "Prohibiting abortion denigrates wo
men as decisionmakers, and it reinforces their role as sexual objects
by undermining their ability to act as sexual agents. It further reduces
the limited power that women are allowed to exercise over their bod
ies and their sexuality in our society." 225 Feminists and other support
ers of women's empowerment generally recognize that respect for all
human beings requires that a woman's autonomy and individual
moral responsibility be the standards that govern the final resolution
of conflicts about reproduction and abortion. 226 The more difficult
question for feminists, and other like-minded folk, is whether, given
the fact that most, if not all, of the fetuses aborted due to their sex are
female, sex-selective abortion is nevertheless called for by the princi
ples of individual dignity, liberty and autonomy. For liberal feminism,
the balancing of harms must sway in favor of its foundational princi
ples of the protection of liberty and autonomy.
The refusal of society, through law, to protect and support wcr
men's ability to make and carry out reproductive decisions, including
a decision to abort a fetus because of its sex, also seems to derive from
the deontological ethical consequences of the view that a fetus is a
person, which equates the moral status of the fetus with the moral
status of the pregnant woman. 227 It is not that feminists believe that
224. See, e.g., Law, Aborlion Compromise, supra note 76, at 940 (mandating waiting
periods for abortion sends powerful message that women make rash decisions and are
not competent moral decisionmakers); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, supra
note 208, at 1035 (consent and notification requirements reflect contempt for women
as law abiding citizens).
. 225. Olsen, supra note 73, at 121. In fact some jurisdictions are beginning to
prosecute women for alcohol and drug use during pregnancy. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Florida, 602 So. 2d 1288 (1992) (Supreme Court overturned conviction of woman
convicted of the delivery of a controlled substance to bapy through umbilical cord
after birth). One California jurisdiction went so far as to charge a woman with child
abuse and neglect for the death of her newborn baby because she failed to follow her
physician's advice. Pamela Rae Stewart was charged in California via California Penal
Code § 270, which was designed to punish the willful omission of "necessary clothing,
food, shelter or medical attention." The allegations against Stewart were that in fail
ing to follow her physician's advice, she contributed to her child's death. Her physi
cian's advice included: abstaining from sexual intercourse and the active care of her
two children, to maintain bed-rest, and to promptly report to the hospital when she
observed vaginal bleeding. Jim Schacter, Woman Accused ofContributing to Baby~ Demise
During Pregnancy, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 1, 1986, part II, at 1. Charges against Ms.
Stewart were dismissed on a pre-trial motion on the grounds that the statute did not
encompass the conduct alleged. Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987, part I, at 3. But I
think that the important fact to note is thatjurisdictions are trying to control women's
bodies and sexuality through law.
226. Fletcher, supra note 217, at 16. The Supreme Court recognized this princi
ple in Tlurrnhurgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, where the Court
reasoned that "[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly pri
vate, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, that a woman's decision ...
whether to end her pregnancy." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
·
227. See discussion supra pp. 176-78.
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the fetus is of no moral significance or consequence. Rather, most
feminists believe that the fetus does not have any moral "rights" of its
own. In contrast, feminists believe that women, undoubtedly, have
full moral status. According to liberal philosophy, this status must in
clude personal autonomy, if it is to have any meaning at all. Women's
autonomy overides concerns about harm to the fetus. Because of the
physical and emotional nature of pregnancy, the fetus' health and
rights must be subordinate to the health and the rights of the woman
carrying it. Treating the fetus as if it were the moral equal of a born
person is intolerable because such treatment is also indicative of soci
ety's sexism and its denigration of women: "Treating a fetus as mor
ally equivalent to a child obscures the active role that mothers play in
procreation and is yet another example of society's tendency to de
value the work that mothers do." 228 Pregnancy is a creative, emotional
and physical process. 229 The fetus is alive because the pregnant wo
man, through gestation, has made it viable. Thus, even if fetuses are
considered persons either morally230 or constitutionally, the compara
tive moral status of the woman and the physical and emotional/
psychic nature of pregnancy may demand access to abortion for any
reason the pregnant woman wishes, including sex-selection. 2 3 1
Support for liberal feminist opposition to prohibitions on sex-se
lective abortion can also be found in Mary Anne Warren's pragmatic
analysis of sex-selection where she argues from the principle of free
dom of choice. As previously discussed, Warren asserts that the moral
presumption regarding sex-selection should be in support of the free
dom to choose "in the absence of powerful countervailing argu
ments. "232 The liberal feminist analysis, in focusing on the principles
of autonomy and liberty, maintains that the harm of prohibitions is to
the autonomy of women in decisionmaking. The harm to women sug
gested by the sociological evidence regarding sex-selection does not
approach the sufficiency of harm necessary to override the liberty of
the woman in her decisionmaking due to the indeterminacy of such
predictions. 233
228. Olsen, supra note 73, at 121.
229. RICH, supra note 75, at 21-40 (who discusses the psychological, physical, and
emotional sufferings and crises of pregnancy and motherhood, and exposes the "insti
tution" of motherhood as it exists under patriarchy as the ghettoization and degrada
tion of female potentialities).
230. There is much debate among theologians and ethicists regarding the moral
status of the fetus. For an example of differing views see Flowers, supra note 74, at 246
48; VATICAN, supra note 68.
231. One commentator has suggested that restricting abortion or denying wo
men independent decisionmaking in this area denies women the opportunity to act
as moral agents. See Schmidt, supra note 205, at 621-23.
232. WARREN, supra note 4, at 180.
233. For a fuller analysis ofWarren's pragmatic method, see supra pp. 181-83 and
corresponding footnotes.
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Hence, a liberal feminist analysis of sex-selective abortion first
recognizes, through analysis and adoption of consequentialist and
pragmatic philosophic methods, that the consequences of any legal
prohibition of sex-selective abortion would fail to legally recognize wo
men as responsible moral agents, and that any such law would by im
plication further the view that women cannot be trusted to make
responsible decisions concerning reproduction. Under a liberal femi
nist approach, all regulations and prohibitions surrounding preg
nancy, abortion, and childbirth are issues of gender inequality. That
is to say, it is a question of whether the State can permissibly discrimi
nate against women and thereby maintain their subordinate legal sta
tus. This analysis focuses on the authority of the pregnant woman,
and the fact that a fetus is a part of a pregnant woman's body, and is
nourished and sustained inside a woman's body; hence anything done
for the benefit of the fetus is done to the pregnant woman.· Under a
liberal feminist construction, the principle of liberty and autonomy
and the legal philosophies of privacy and equal protection demand
the legal protection of women's decisionmaking in this arena, includ
ing the decision to abort on the basis of fetal sex. This is not to as
sume that future generations of women will not be disadvantaged
socially, economically, or politically by sex-selective abortion, as the
sociological data indicates. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the
current consequences of such restrictions - that women are also dis
advantaged by laws which are founded on the notion of women's in
ability to make responsible decisions and as a result severely curtail or
prohibit women's self-determination.
Given the full moral status of women, the physical and emotional
nature of pregnancy and childbirth, the ways in which a forced preg
nancy is oppressive to women, and of course, the historical and cur
rent oppression of women, abortion and sex-selective abortion still
raise equal protection issues, regardless of the moral or legal status of
the fetus. These are issues which ordinarily must be decided in favor ·
of women's rights to bodily integrity and self-determination:
The differential burden that denying access to contraceptives im
poses upon women is not a facially neutral policy having a disparate
impact upon different groups of people - no man faces the physi
cal risks of pregnancy. Even assuming that both parents bear equal
responsibility for the child after birth, only women are confronted
with the choice of obtaining an abortion or enduring the physical
burdens of pregnancy.234

A liberal feminist would assert that under either MacKinnon's
and Law's analyses, any State regulation or prohibition of sex-selective
abortion would be constitutionally impermissible. Under these analy
ses, the regulation or prohibition would fail because jt "contributes to
the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because of
234. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, supra note 208, at 978.
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gender status." 235 Powerlessness and subordination accompany the
inability to control reproduction and bodily integrity. Women would
be forced to bear fetuses that they did not wish to bear. This would
indeed contribute to the maintenance of women's second class status
due to their reproductive capacity, which is, of course, gender status.

v.

TOWARD

A

RADICAL ANALYSIS OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION: THE
NECESSI'IY OF FEMINIST VISION

What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine
the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the most narrow
perimeters of change are possible and allowable. . . . For the master's tools
will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to
beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about
genuine change.
- Audre Lorde, The Masters Tools Will Never
Dismantle The Master's House ( 1984)

Arguments in favor of liberty, autonomy in decisionmaking, and
self-determination for women in the reproductive sphere are legally
and morally compelling. The constitutional right to safe and legal
abortion was fought for by many women on these grounds. On the
other hand, the critical legal studies and feminist movements have
taught us that this ideology of liberty has, on numerous occasions,
deflected our attention from the investigation of reproductive tech
nology as an institution of patriarchy. 236 The focus on individual
rights has allowed us to neglect larger issues of social need and
justice. 237
235. CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL lIARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra
note 205, at 117.
236. As Janice Raymond has noted:
[T]his ideology prevents us from examining technological and contractual
reproduction as an institution and leads us to neglect the conditions that
create industrialized breeding and the role that it plays in society. Choice so
dominates the discussion that when critics of technological reproduction de
nounce the ways in which women are abused by these procedures, we are
accused of making women into victims and, supposedly, of denying that wo
men are capable of choice. To expose victimization of women is to be
blamed for creating women as victims.
RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS, supra note 15, at x; see also MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASS
MENT, supra note 205, at 99.
237. This of course is the critical legal studies critique of rights. Critical legal
theorists assert that rights talk is harmful because when rights are balanced against
vital social issues of need, the emphasis on the importance of individual rights creates
conditions where social needs are continuously ignored. See, e.g., UNGER, supra note
195, at 597; Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1984) (pursuit of rights is foolish and misled); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenowgj of
Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1582
(1984). For a fuller explanation and critique of the critical legal studies view of rights,
see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics, supra note 200, at 593
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Radical feminist legal theory also offers a critique of classic indi
vidualism and rights-talk. The radical feminist analysis ofwomen's op
pression focuses on .the existence of patriarchy as a system of
comprehensive power and authority under the control of men.
Through entrenched systems of racism and classism, these men, some
what successfully, dominate and control other men of different races
and men oflower economic status. As AlisonJaggar has noted in her
analysis of radical feminism, radical feminists believe that in order to
legitimize the domination of others, white male culture "invents ideol
ogies that define subordinate groups as inferior for one reason or an
other: as lazy, shiftless, stupid, greedy, emotional, sly, childish,
barbaric, or uncultured. Under patriarchy, many of these attributes
are applied to women as well as to subordinated groups not defined
primarily by sex. "23B
Also central to radical feminism is the understanding that women
are oppressed in ways that are directly related to their gendered status
as women. Through systems of gender oppression, men dominate wo
men. Women under patriarchy are viewed as human beings whose
most important role is that of mother and caretaker: to have and raise
children and to satisfy the sexual and emotional needs of men. As
MacKinnon has explained regarding the importance ofwomen's sexu
ality to patriarchy:
If women are socially defined such that female sexuality cannot be

lived or spoken or felt or even somatically sensed apart from its en
forced definition, so that it is its own lack, then there is no such
thing as a woman as such, there are only walking embodiments of
men's projected needs. For feminism, asking whether there is, so
cially, a female sexuality is the same as asking whether women
exist.239

In addition, "[t]his ideology limits what women may do under patri
archy and delegitimizes whatever they in fact do that goes beyond the
limits of the patriarchal definition." 240 Hence radical feminism often
96. But even Duncan Kennedy acknowledges that rights claims should not be com
pletely abandoned:
[T]he critique of rights as liberal philosophy does not imply that the left
should abandon rights rhetoric as a tool of political organizing or legal argu
ment. Embedded in the rights notion is a liberating accomplishment of our
culture: the affirmation of free human subjectivity against the constraints of
group life, along with the paradoxical countervision of a group life that cre
ates and nurtures individuals capable of freedom. We need to work at the
slow transformation of rights rhetoric, at dereifying it, rather than simply
junking it.
Duncan Kennedy, Critical Lahar Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. LJ. 503, 506
(1980-81).
238. AusoN M.JAGGAR, FEMINIST PoLITics AND HUMAN NATURE 255 (1988).
239. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7(3) SIGNS 515 (1982).
240. JAGGAR, supra note 238, at 255.
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focuses on the gender domination of women in the institutions of
motherhood and family, as well as the gender domination of women's
sexuality and reproductive capabilities - all of which are maintained
and enforced through social and legal structures. 241 This theory of
the male domination of women through family institutions has been
extended to include an analysis of the state: an institutional surrogate
for male control of women inside and outside of the family.2 42
Many radical feminists are critical of rights-talk due to its justifica
tions of state power based on the enforcement of individual rights. 243
Rights and claims to rights are part of the patriarchal system of law
which is represented by the belief in the importance of objectivity,
distance and abstraction. 244 "Abstract rights", according to MacKin
non, "authorize the male experience of the world," 245 and as a result,
rights-talk tends to delegitimize women's experience of the world,
such as their treatment under the law governing reproductive technol
ogies, and the importance of women's material needs. 246 As one radi
cal feminist scholar and activist noted: "It is from rights-thinking that
we get that curious abstraction of the fetus without a womb. Sooner
241. Radical feminism has been historically criticized by many feminists, particu
larly feminist and other women of color for its proclivity to universalize the experi
ence of white women as the experience of all women, ignoring differences of race,
class, and ethnicity among women, and the separation of its understanding of patri
archy from ·other features of the political economy. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). But see Susan
Christian, Woman (Modified), 4 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 171 (1991) ("A perspective de
fined by a focus upon a form of inequality which affects all women, albeit in different
ways depending on our characteristics and resources, is not inherently 'essential
ist.'"); e. christi cunningham, Unmaddening: A Response to Angela Harris, 4 YALEJ.L. &
FEMINISM 155 (1991) ("MacKinnon cannot define Black women, but in deconstruct
ing male definitions that have been imposed on women, she creates space for new
definitions.").
242. See, e.g., MAcK!NNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note
110, at 170; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique ofRights Analysis, 63 TEX.
L. REv. 387, 400 (1984); cf. Siegel, supra note 200, at 377 (abortion restrictions coerce
women to perform the work of motherhood without altering the conditions that
make such work a principal cause of women's secondary status). For a brief history
and analysis of radical feminism, see al,so MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGUIATION OF THE LIVES
OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PREsENT 22-24
(1988); jAGGAR, supra note 238, at 249-302. See al,so FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDA
TIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
243. See, e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 191.
244. See Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics, supra note 200, at 597, 600.
245. Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward
Feminist jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 658 (1983); see al,so id., at 644-45;Janet Rifkin, To
ward a Theory ofLaw and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980).
246. See also John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp and Fire Music
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2129,
2215 (1992) ("Th[e] process whereby rights are defined by law, however, is substan
tially isolated from the very needs that generated those rights and the values they
envisaged.").
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or later we have to expose rights-based perspectives ... for what they
are: a poorly disguised way of preserving things just as they are."247
Although rights-talk can divert political vision and discourse from
issues of group oppression by reinforcing individualism, for many,
rights and rights-talk fills an important social need. AB critical race
scholar Patricia Williams has explained regarding African-Americans:
"For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is sym
bolic of all of the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a
respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that
elevates one's status from human body to social being." 248 Williams
also explains that: "The vocabulary of rights speaks to an establish
ment that values the guise of stability, and from whom social change
for the better must come (whether it is given, taken, or smuggled)."249
Furthermore, historically, the assertion of needs, in addition to the
assertion of rights, or in place of the assertion of rights, as advocated
by critical legal studies scholars, has been unsuccessful for disen
franchised groups in our society. Again, Williams notes: "For blacks,
describing needs has been a dismal failure as political activity.... The
history of our need is certainly moving enough to have been called
poetry, oratory and epic entertainment - but it has never been
treated by white institutions as a statement of political priority."250 AB
a result of these observations, critical race theorists, as well as other
scholars of color, have encouraged the fight for rights. Rights, they
have found, serve a dual purpose. Rights "facilitate our access to a
variety of legal norms and enforcement mechanisms by which we try
to indicate ... important claims."251 Rights rhetoric and ideology are
also useful "to mobilize support for a particular agenda." 252 AB John
Calmore observes: "Until the subjugated group feels a sense of moral
outrage, the group will almost certainly fail to resist the injustice that
is oppressing it. "253 Hence, although rights-talk can be liberating as
well as alienating for the disenfranchised, 254 the enhancement of
rights' liberatory potential is at the heart of critical race theory. Many
feminists have agreed with Williams, Calmore, and other critical race
theorists on these points, asserting that rights and rights-talk have pos
247. RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 191 (quoting Sherene Razack, Wrong Rights: Fem
inism Applied to Law, 10 LE BUil.ETIN I NEwSLETIER, !NSIITUT SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR 13
(1990)).
248. PATRICIA]. Wll.LIAMs, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAw PROFES
SOR 153 (1991). As Raymond notes, the movement from body to social being is also
relevant in women's struggle for reproductive justice. See RAYMOND, supra note 15, at
192.
249. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 401, 410 (1987).
250. Id. at 412.
251. Calmore, supra note 246, at 2211.
252. Id.
253. Id. (footnote omitted).
254. See Roberts, supra note 153, at 591.
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itive value. Elizabeth M. Schneider has noted that critical legal theo
rists as well as feminist theorists opposed to rights-talk "see only the
limits of rights, and fail to appreciate the dual possibilities of rights
discourse.... [Rights discourse] can help to affirm human values,
enhance political growth, and assist in the development of collective
identity." 255 For example, rights have historically helped to move the
nation's thinking and actions along regarding some matters of civil
rights and racial justice. Rights have also empowered women as a so
cial group by giving some women power, although limited, over
whether and when they choose motherhood.
Even in light of the criticism placed on the value of rights in our
society, rights and rights discourse have been, and will continue to be,
useful to disenfranchised groups in our struggle for a just society.
Rights-talk speaks to the interpretive community. It speaks in the lan
guage of those who hold power. 256 In order for any dissenting view to
be seriously considered in legal discourse, those in control must un
derstand the claims of the dispossessed and take those claims seri
ously. Nevertheless, individual rights are the "tools of a racist
patriarchy," to use Audre Lorde's metaphor, and "will never dismantle
the master's house." 2 5 7 While rights discourse, as currently framed by
liberalism, permits reform, it will never allow the destruction of patri
archy and hence will never allow the radical changes needed to truly
transform women's social and political status.
A.

Another Way to Think about llights: Transfomiing Feminist
Consciousness

Feminism must mean something more than liberalism for wo
men. Feminism becomes impoverished liberalism if its only·meaning
is "anything goes."
When a woman's right to do whatever she wants to her body is valo
rized as feminism, feminism is stripped of its collective content and
becomes little more than an individual woman's ability to adopt her
self to the bourgeois image of the self-centered man.25 8

Rights, too, become meaningless when they are not used as a tool to
advance social justice. Rights, as we have seen in various civil rights
contexts, can assist in the diminution of subordination. But rights
and rights rhetoric can only be useful if they are not separated from
issues of social justice and other ethical concerns. Therefore, in order
to ethically support rights in the reproductive arena, feminists must
255. Schneider, Dialectic ofRights and Politics, supra note 200, at 597-98.
256. Cf Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 84-85,
88 (1985) (common law theory of possession gives preference to those who articulate
their intentions in a specific vocabulary and in a structure that is approved of and
understood by those in power).
257. Audre Lorde, The Masters Tools will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SIS
TER OUTSIDER 110-13 (1984).
258. RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 194.

1995] A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION 217

seek to ensure that the rights sought do not create new forms of sub
ordination for women of any race or class, or for members of other
subordinated groups. 259 Feminism must consider whether the right
to choose abortion, as it is currently framed by liberalism, increases
women's reproductive freedom or increases the exploitation of wo
men's reproductive capacities. It must consider the ways in which re
productive technologies, like sex-selective abortion, will affect the
value or status ofwomen in this gender-based society. Even many fem
inists who have argued against the legal regulation of sex-selective
abortion have recognized that the principle of freedom of choice
must be secondary to the principles of social fairness and equal pro
tection if women's subordination is to be reduced or eradicated. 260
There must be a point at which the rights of individual women im
pinge so strongly on women as a social group that social or legal regu
lation is required. 261 Therefore, if rights-talk is to be a useful tool of
feminist discourse in this area, freedom of choice must be weighed
against the commitment to ending subordination. 262 In the final anal
ysis, rights discourse must include an understanding of the historical
and contemporary injustices towards women, as well as an understand
ing of women's social training in patriarchy which often requires wo
men to collude with patriarchy to their own disadvantage.
For example, when considering issues of substantive justice and
their connection to ethical considerations, we must consider whether
rights-talk fully considers the social, economic and political contexts
in which women make "choices" concerning the abortion of gendered
(female) fetuses. In bringing attention to the context of these
choices, I am not arguing that women cannot make moral choices
under conditions of oppression. Women, like other subordinated
groups, are always forced into double-bind choices: "situations in
which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to
penalty, censure or deprivation."263
In the context of sex-selective abortion, women are forced to
make double-bind choices. The choices for a woman, once she knows
the sex of her female fetus, are few. A woman can choose to abort the
female fetus because of its sex for any of several reasons. There may
be familial pressures for her to produce male children. She may con
259. Cf. Matsuda, supra note 105, at 1771.
260. See, e.g., Powledge, supra note 71; Roberta Steinbacher & Helen B. Holmes,
Sex Choice: Survival and Sisterhood, in MAN-MADE WOMEN, supra note 25, at 52, 61.
261. See Rowland, supra note 25, at 84.
262. Several feminist and critical race scholars have stressed the importance of
an anti-subordination prinicple in the quest for equality, and in their critique of lib
eral rights-talk. See, e.g., MAcK!NNON, TowARD AFEMINisr THEORY OF THE STATE, supra
note 110, at 215-34; Mari]. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting
Seeds in Plowed Up Ground, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1988); Ruth Colker, Anti.Subordi
nation Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986).
263. Marilyn Frye, oppression, in THE PoLITics OF REALnY: ESSAYS IN FEMINisr
THEORY 1, 2 (1983).

218

WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 10:161

sider the cultural denigration of women and girls; she knows that her
daughter's life will be difficult as a woman because of the social, eco
nomic, and political obstacles under patriarchy. Or she may have her
own preference for male children, which is also culturally pro
duced. 264 If the woman chooses not to abort the female fetus, she
may face, at the very least, the disappointment and ridicule of her
family, especially if she doesn't have any male children already. She
may also face pressure to have additional children so that perhaps she
will be "lucky enough" to have a boy. In some circumstances, the wo
man may face death or divorce; her daughter may face a life of dis
criminatory treatment in education and employment, as well as
discrimination in access to health care and nutrition.
On the other hand, the choices for a woman, once she knows the
sex of her male fetus, are similiarly constrained. A woman who elects
to abort the male fetus because of its sex, based on her desire to raise
female children, may be viewed with scorn by her partner and her
family. She may be viewed as foolish and imprudent under the best
circumstances. Under the worst circumstances, she may face divorce
or death. If she decides not to have or raise male children, as a
method of non-participation in her own oppression, she challenges
patriarchical political and social institutions. Her refusal to support
patriarchy by having male children can be understood as a form of the
pragmatic social criticism to which Corne! West refers. 265 The woman
who aborts a male fetus because of its gender may indeed be commit
ting a revolutionary act. 266 But like the decision not to abort a female
fetus, the decision to abort a male fetus may have dire social conse
quences for the pregnant woman.
Being in this double-bind means that the choices of a pregnant
woman with an engendered fetus are restrained and conditioned by
the tenets of patriarchy which devalue the lives of women and girls.
The patriarchal values at work here are "not accidental or occasional
and hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in
such a way as to catch one (ie. woman) between and among them and
restrict or penalize motion in any direction." 267 Therefore, I am not
asserting that women are incapable of making positive choices within
the contexts of powerlessness and vulnerability. Women are forced to
make double-bind choices all of the time. However, where women's
lives are so devalued by society, how much value do those choices have
when made from a position of subordination and powerlessness? How
much value do those choices have when they may ultimately increase
264. Id. at 14 ("[m]any of the restrictions and limitations we live with are more
or less internalized and self-monitored, and are part of our adaptation to the require
ments and expectations imposed by the needs and tastes and tyrannies of others.").
Cf RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 99, 100.
265. See supra note 113.
266. Id.
267. FRYE, supra note 263, at 4.
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the subordination and vulnerability of women? In other words, by val
uing "choice" in this context, do we minimize or devalue the discrimi
nation and powerlessness that women face under patriarchal systems?
Catharine MacKinnon, in explaining why sex-selective abortion
should not be permitted in the context of patriarchy, has written:
[I]n a context of mass abortions of female fetuses, the pressures on
women to destroy potential female offfspring are tremendous and
oppressive unless restrictions exist. While under conditions of sex
inequality monitoring women's reasons for deciding to abort is wor
rying, the decision is not a free one, even absent governmental in
tervention, where a male life is valued and a female life is not. 268

I believe that the importance of this context is what Cornel West is
referring to when he talks about the necessity of prophetic pragma
tism and pragmatism as political theoiy.269
Many reproductive rights, such as the right to buy and use contra
ception and the right to choose abortion, gave women with economic
resources power and control over their lives. These rights allowed wo
men to choose whether or when to have children. Women with finan
cial resources no longer had to continue unplanned pregnancies or
have back-alley abortions. 270 Sex-selective abortion is different be
cause its consequences do not lie in the dismantling of patriarchal
domination. We have seen that the overwhelming majority of women
who make choices regarding sex-selective abortion make the choice to
destroy the female fetus. Thus, while abortion gives women control
over whether or when to have children, sex-selective abortion gives
men (husbands and families) 271 greater influence over women's repro
duction and the sexual composition of future generations. Sex-selec
tive abortion also increases the possibilities of expanded
discrimination of women based on gender. 272 Instead of eliminating
the subordination of women and girls, sex-selective abortion increases
women's social, economic, political and reproductive exploitation. It
makes women vulnerable to a new set of pressures by giving prospec
tive moral status to the fetus she carries.
The current use of sex-selective abortion is based on patterns of
male preference and female subordination. In viewing the use of the
technology from a radical feminist and modified pragmatic position,
support for the selective abortion of female fetuses is impossible. Sex
268. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, supra note 200, at 1317
n.157.
269. West, The Limits of Neopragmatism, supra note 92; and WEST, THE AMERICAN
EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 106.
270. Because of the severe limitations on federal funding for abortion, many
poor women have been forced to continue unplanned pregnancies or have abortions
performed by unlicensed providers. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Hyde
Amendment, which restricts federal funding for most abortions for poor women, held
constitutional).
271. LERNER, supra note 49 (The nuclear family is an institution of patriarchy).
272. See supra pp. 173-75 and accompanying notes.
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selective abortion, if available on a large scale, would be used to vic
timize women and girls both individually and as a social group, serv
ing to disempower women and continue their subordination. Sex
selective abortion used under patriarchy strengthens patriarchy. This
result is in direct opposition to the tenets and goals of feminism and
modified pragmatism used as political theory.

B.

The Possibility of a Feminist Solution

The question remains: Do we prohibit the practice of the selec
tive abortion of female fetuses in light of the precariousness of wo
men's reproductive rights?
As previously noted, constitutional abortion jurisprudence would
seem to allow the State to restrict abortion for the purpose of sex
selection. Under the constitutional test articulated in Casey, a state
regulation burdening the abortion decision would be unconstitu
tional only if the regulation were unduly burdensome. 273 In other
words, the State may not severely limit access to legal abortion. Under
the Casey rationale, the state could "express (its) profound respect for
the life of the (fetus)," 274 encourage childbirth over abortion, 275 or
even express its commitment to sex equality and prohibit the selective
abortion of female fetuses.2 76 Under the rationales found in Casey
and Rust, the state might be able to constitutionally limit a pregnant
woman's access to the sex identification information of her fetus, if
such a regulation is designed to persuade women to choose childbirth
over abortion, 277 or designed to foster the non-subordination of wo
men and girls, and if the regulation does not have a severe impact on
the availability of legal abortion. 278 In either of the above scenarios,
the woman seeking an abortion for the purpose of sex-selection would
still have access to legal abortion; she would only be unable to factor
the sex of her fetus into the decision.279
Despite the possible constitutionality of a prohibition of sex-selec
tive abortion, feminist scholars have refused to support law reform
measures which would restrict a woman's right to choose abortion on
any grounds, because such restrictions would be anathema to the
goals and aspirations of the women's movement. 280 Many feminist
scholars who have approached the problem of sex-selective abortion
have argued that legal prohibition of sex-selective abortion is politi
273. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
274. Id. at 2821.
275. Id. at 2824.
276. Note, however, that the courts have been reluctant to use fundamental
rights to promote equality. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
277. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
278. See supra pp. 190-201 for a discussion of Casey.
279. Cf. Schedler, supra note 10, at 328-30.
280. See, e.g., Powledge, supra note 13; Renteln, supra note 30, at 421.

1995] A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION 221

cally imprudent, given the precarious nature ofwomen's reproductive
rights in this country and around the globe. Many of these scholars
believe that if it becomes legally permissible or required for the state
or the medical establishment to question women's judgment regard
ing the abortion decision, the very foundation of women's reproduc
tive freedom will be shattered, and women will be subject to increased
scrutiny over all reproductive decisions, furthering the subordination
ofwomen.281 Thus, they argue, any restrictions on abortion are insup
portable in the present context. In addition, many scholars con
cerned about the impact of the selective abortion of female fetuses on
the status of women have argued against legal prohibition of the abor
tion and in favor of informal social deterrence. Some of these schol
ars have advocated deterrence by encouraging doctors and genetic
counselors to intentionally withhold information regarding fetal sex
except in the context of sex-linked diseases. 282 Others have suggested
a program of social deterrence that would eliminate funding for sex
selection research. 283 Still other feminist scholars have suggested that
the proper way to combat the problem of sex-selection is through con
sciousness-raising.284
While some forms of social deterrence and consciousness-raising
may be important components of a feminist and modified pragmatic
approach to the problem of the selective abortion of female fetuses,
there has been little feminist exploration regarding why and whether
legal control of the knowledge of fetal sex is appropriate. 285 Dorothy
Roberts is one scholar who has considered restrictions on the access to
information in the abortion context. With regard to the "gag" rule at
281. Wertz & Fletcher, supra note 35, at 26.
282. See, e.g., John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Genetics and the Law: Ethic,
Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY LJ. 747, 789-90
(1990) (law prohibiting abortion for sex-selection appropriate only where there is
evidence of abuse; where no abuse, legal prohibition may set harmful precedents re
stricting abortion choices); Wertz & Fletcher, supra note 35.
283. Powledge, supra note 13, at 208-09.
284. See, e.g., Renteln, supra note 30, at 422. Consciousness-raising, "the collec
tive critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's social experience, as women
live through it," has been an important feminist political tool in that it has helped
women to name their oppression and develop tools to fight their oppression within
themselves (internalized oppression), as well as against their oppressors. MAcK!NNoN,
TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 110, at 83; see Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 200, at 602-03. In this way, consciousness
raising is both educative and a form of political practice and resistance. Therefore it
seems quite clear that consciousness-raising can be an important tool in the develop
ment of feminist discourse in the area of sex-selective abortion of female fetuses. As
Alison Renteln has noted, "it is necessary to challenge those who consciously endorse
the tenets and goals of the women's movement but who still exhibit the desire for
firstborn male; why is this so? . . . Only through consciousness raising will women
come to value themselves and their daughters." Renteln, supra note 30, at 422.
285. Schedler argues that a prohibition on access to fetal sex information is con
stitutionally permissible. See Schedler, supra note 10, at 311-28.
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issue in Rust v. Sullivan, 286 which prohibited doctors and others work
ing at federally funded health care clinics from giving pregnant wo
men information about abortion and abortion services, Roberts notes
that the regulations at issue banned information that was vital to poor
women's "well-being, autonomy, and participation in the commu
nity."287 Roberts concludes that by intentionally fostering ignorance
among poor black women, these regulations "are an example of the
control of knowledge that helps to maintain the existing structure of
racial domination." 288 The denial of reproductive freedom has been a
principal means of subjugating Black women in the United States. 289
The denial of information about abortion denied poor Black women
the knowledge necessary to control their lives and hence was part of
that continued subordination and subjugation.
Whether and how Roberts' analysis of the control of knowledge
bears upon the problem of sex-selective abortion is not self-evident.
Would the denial of information regarding fetal sex deny women the
knowledge necessary to control their lives? Without access to fetal sex
information, women will still be able to access legal abortion. Addi
tionally, denying women the opportunity to choose male children has
not historically been a means of gender oppression, butjust the oppo
site: Son preference has been one method of gender oppression in
patriarchal systems. Limiting sex identification information might in
fact circumscribe some of the oppression faced by women. Unlike the
restriction of information at issue in Rust, which supported existing
social arrangements, 290 a restriction on access to fetal sex information
may permit the oppressed to take steps to change their status. 291
Again, such a restriction would act as a social criticism of a system
where the institutionalization of misogyny is so great that we must act
in such a radical manner. A restriction on fetal sex information chal
lenges the social and political arrangements that have harmed women
of all races in the United States.
CONCLUSION

The issue of abortion is often framed as a feminist issue of choice
and respect for women's bodily and moral integrity. Many feminists
have opposed the legal regulation of sex-selective abortion on these
terms without sufficient regard for negative sociological predictions,
the meaning for women of the abortion of almost exclusively female
fetuses, and the possibility that rights are limiting as a liberatory prac
tice. Individual rights in the reproductive context are often devoid of
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See discussion regarding Rust v. Sullivan, supra pp. 194-96.
Roberts, supra note 153, at 616.
Id.
Id. at 641; see also DAVIS, supra note 24.
Roberts, supra note 153, at 618.

See id. at 617.
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substantive justice. The effects of an individual woman's right to use
sex-selective abortion goes beyond herself and can augment the op
pression that she and other women ultimately face. Moving away from
a liberal conception of rights and insisting that rights theory and prac
tice embrace substantive justice and other ethical concerns allows a
shift from the conception of reproductive decisions as based on indi
vidual choice to a practice of rights that sufficiently considers group
harm, and permits a critique of current social arrangements that en
courage and sometimes require women to actively participate in their
own annihilation. The resulting social outcomes are no longer
subordinated to "process neutrality" but rather informed by substan
tive justice. As a result, the importance of individual choice or prefer
ence to the question of the permissibility of sex-selective abortion
becomes secondary to the issue of substantive justice for women as a
social group. Because the current use of sex-selective abortion is
based on patterns of male preference and female subordination, and
because of the deleterious social consequences of sex-selective abor
tion for women, a restriction on the availability of fetal sex informa
tion is warranted under this modified pragmatic and feminist
framework. The right to choose does not necessarily facilitate liberty;
choosing justice does.
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